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SCHRODINGER'S CORPORATION: THE
PARADOX OF RELIGIOUS SINCERITY IN
HETEROGENEOUS CORPORATIONS
CATHERINE A. HARDEE*
Abstract: Consider a corporation where one group of shareholders holds sincere
religious beliefs and another group of shareholders does not share those beliefs
but, for a price, will allow the religious shareholders to request a religious ex-
emption to a neutrally applicable law on behalf of the corporation. The corpora-
tion is potentially both religiously sincere and insincere at the same time. A claim
by the corporation for a religious accommodation requires the court to solve the
paradox created by this duality and to declare the corporation, as a whole, either
sincere or insincere in its beliefs. Although the Supreme Court and scholars have
noted some of the particular issues raised when determining the religious sinceri-
ty of shareholders' claims, to date, no one has engaged systematically with the
question of whose religious sincerity should be attributed to the corporation when
shareholders hold heterogeneous, or diverse, religious beliefs.
This Article provides a framework for determining the sincerity of corporations
with religiously heterogeneous hareholders. It proposes an attribution inquiry
that engages in a meaningful dialog between state corporate law and theories of
religious sincerity. What little attention attribution has received tends to suggest
that state law regarding corporate control provides an easy corollary. It does not.
Corporate law is designed to enable contracting in pursuit of economic efficien-
cy. Allowing control to stand in for attribution would lead to the monetization of
religious sincerity, harming third parties and diminishing the value of religious
liberty both in the courts and in the public eye. This Article considers alternative
ways in which principles of state corporate law can shape the attribution inquiry
to better delimit exemptions while still protecting the value of religious liberty.
Ultimately, it concludes that meaningful restrictions should be placed on the abil-
ity of shareholders with heterogeneous religious beliefs to contract among them-
selves for corporate religious sincerity.
© 2020, Catherine A. Hardee. All rights reserved.
* Associate Dean for Research & Faculty Development and Associate Professor of Law, Califor-
nia Western School of Law. The author is grateful for the helpful feedback from the participants at the
University of Kentucky College of Law Speaker Series, with special thanks to Brian L. Frye and
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The Paradox ofReligious Sincerity
INTRODUCTION
Despite the robust scholarly debate surrounding the Supreme Court's con-
troversial decision in Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc. and the future of
corporate free exercise claims, at least one important component of corporate
religious accommodation claims has remained undertheorized: How should
courts evaluate the religious sincerity of corporations whose shareholders do
not hold the same religious beliefs?' Religiously heterogeneous shareholders
within a single corporation create a paradox, as some shareholders are sincere
in their religious beliefs, whereas other shareholders disavow any religious
sincerity. The Supreme Court determines whether a corporation is entitled to a
religious exemption to neutrally applicable laws not by determining the reli-
gious nature of the corporation itself, but by examining the religious sincerity
of corporate shareholders. Like Schr6dinger's famous thought experiment, the
religiously heterogeneous corporation can, thus, be conceived of as simultane-
ously sincere and insincere .2 This duality must be resolved, however, when the
corporation requests a religious exemption-the court must "open the box" to
peer inside the corporation and declare it either sincere or insincere.
This Article identifies a gap in the theory underpinning the Supreme
Court's analysis of corporate religious sincerity and provides a solution: a two-
part inquiry into both the veracity of the shareholders' claimed religious beliefs
and an additional attribution inquiry into whose religious beliefs should be
considered in determining the sincerity of the corporation. The attribution
question is not as simple as asking who within the corporation has the power to
decide to seek an exemption.3 State corporate law is not structured to consider
shareholders' motives, other than profit motives. 4 Thus, a control test will in-
1 See 573 U.S. 682 (2014).
2 Schn5dinger's thought experiment was this: A cat sits inaboxwithapoisonthatcanbe "triggered
by the radioactive decay of a subatomic particle," which is "capable of being in multiple states at once
meaning that a particle could be decaying or not decaying at the same time." Therefore, the poison could
be released and not released, and the cat could be dead and not dead. It is not until the box is opened that
the cat's actual state is determined. Rachel Feltman, Schrodinger 's Cat Just GotEven Weirder (andEven
More Confusing), WASH. POST (May 27, 2016, 10:43 AM), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/
speaking-of-science/wp/2016/05/27/schrodingers-cat-just-got-even-weirder-and-even-more-confusing/
?utm term-.0fc8b0172c06 [https://penna.cc/DK5R-WXL4].
-See infra Part II.B.
4 Although there is great debate regarding whether corporations may onlybe motivated by profit,
it is much less controversial to acknowledge that profit is the only motive that the law can be certain
all shareholders have in common. See George A. Mocsary, Freedom of Corporate Purpose, 2016
BYU L. REV. 1319, 1321 (advocating for allowing broader corporate purpose but still recognizing
profit as a universal motivation); Leo E. Strine, Jr. & Nicholas Walter, Conservative Collision
Course?: The Tension Between Conservative Corporate Law Theory and Citizens United, 100 COR-
NELL L. REv. 335, 346-47 (2015) (listing prominent scholars who have endorsed the view that profit
is the only appropriate end for corporations).
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evitably lead to the monetization of religious sincerity, which is detrimental to
third parties and diminishes the value of religious liberty both in the doctrine
and public perception.5 A framework is needed to determine attribution that
harmonizes the conflicting value systems behind religious liberty and state
corporate law. This Article evaluates the potential factors that courts should
consider in creating such a framework when they are inevitably faced with a
claim for accommodation on behalf of a religiously heterogeneous corporation.
Ultimately, it concludes that the law should limit the ability of corporate partic-
ipants to contract for the religious sincerity of the corporation.
The Supreme Court's recent recognition that at least certain corporations
may qualify for religious exemptions to neutrally applicable laws has fueled an
intense debate among constitutional and corporate scholars. Scholars of law
and religion have given significant attention to a variety of issues raised by the
Supreme Court's rapidly evolving religious accommodations jurisprudence.6
Corporate law scholars, on the other hand, have largely focused on how grant-
ing corporations the right to exercise religion impacts state corporate law and
the balance of power between corporations and the state.7 Although a few
scholars have analyzed the impact of corporate religious rights on the question
of religious sincerity, little attention has been paid to the theoretical complexity
caused by the interplay between religious sincerity and the practical realities of
corporate law.8
'See infra Part I.C.
6 See, e.g., Brendan Beery, Prophylactic Free Exercise: The FirstAmendment andReligion in a
Post-Kennedy World, 82 ALB. L. REV. 121,122 (2018) (describing the shift infree exercise jurispru-
dence from "dynamic" to "prophylactic free exercise"). See generally Kent Greenawalt, Individual
Conscience andHow ItShouldBe Treated, 31 J.L. & RELIGION 306 (2016) (surveying current litera-
ture on religious exemptions); Leslie Kendrick & Micah Schwartzman, The Etiquette ofAnimus, 132
HARV. L. REV. 133 (2018) (critiquing the Supreme Court's decision inMasterpiece Cakeshop, Ltd. v.
Colorado CivilRights Commission as failing to meaningfully engage with the conflictbetween LGBT
rights and religious liberty).
' See generally Vincent S.J. Buccola, States'Rights Against Corporate Rights, 2016 COLUM.
BUS. L. REV. 595 (considering the evolving jurisprudence's effect on states' traditional powers to
define corporations); Brett H. McDonnell, The Liberal Case for Hobby Lobby, 57 ARIZ. L. REV. 777
(2015) (arguing that Hobby Lobby in fact embodies a progressive view of the corporation); Elizabeth
Pollman, Constitutionalizing Corporate Law, 69 VAND. L. REV. 639 (2016) (describing the mismatch
between existing corporate law and the burden placed on it by religious rights for corporations); Eliz-
abeth Sepper, Free Exercise Lochnerism, 115 COLUM. L. REV. 1453 (2015) (arguing corporate rights
constitute an end run around the democratic process). See also generally Leo E. Strine, Jr., A Job Is
Not a Hobby: The JudicialRevival of Corporate Paternalism and Its Problematic Implications, 41 J.
CORP. L. 71, 109 10 (2015) (criticizing Hobby Lobby as inconsistent with state corporate law).
8 See generally Nathan S. Chapman, Adjudicating Religious Sincerity, 92 WASH. L. REV. 1185
(2017) (focusing on Hobby Lobby's impact on traditional religious-sincerity doctrine and assuming
the control test will apply for attribution); Richard Carlson, The Sincerely Religious Corporation, 19
MARQ. BENEFITS & SOC. WELFARE L. REV. 165 (2018) (comparing religious sincerity tests between
for-profit and nonprofit organizations and noting that complexity will grow when the Court faces
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In adjudicating the religious incerity requirement of accommodation
claims, courts have long recognized that it is appropriate to judge the sincerity,
or truthfulness, of the claimant's beliefs but not the accuracy or centrality of
such beliefs.9 Given this relatively settled doctrine, it is perhaps not surprising
that the majority in Hobby Lobby summarily dismissed the government's con-
cern about the difficulty in determining the religious sincerity of a corporation
based on the sincerity of its shareholders. ' 0 Focusing on the familiar question
of whether the shareholders were truthful in their claim that they hold certain
religious beliefs, the Court stated that corporate religious sincerity claims are
"seemingly less difficult" than some individual religious sincerity claims, such
as claims made by prisoners, whose veracity is more dubious. "1 It is true that
courts can determine shareholder veracity under the same rubric as individual
religious sincerity, with only a slight modification to include the claimant's
sincere belief that their religion commands them to run their corporation in
accordance with their religious beliefs. 12
In focusing solely on veracity, however, the Court greatly underestimated
the complexity of evaluating a request for a religious exemption by a single
entity-a corporation-when that request is based on the divergent beliefs of
numerous individual shareholders under a virtually infinite set of business
structures and contracts. A partial explanation of the Court's oversight is that
corporations that have come before the Court thus far have all had sharehold-
ers with homogenous religious beliefs. 13 In Hobby Lobby, however, the Court
strongly signaled a willingness to consider religious exemption claims by cor-
porations with shareholders who hold heterogeneous religious beliefs. 14 When
one group of shareholders hares a sincerely held religious belief and another
group of shareholders does not share those beliefs but either acquiesces to, or
opposes the religious exemption, a corporation is conceivably both religiously
shareholder disagreement); Ben Adams & Cynthia Barmore, Recent Decision, Questioning Sincerity:
The Role of the Courts After Hobby Lobby, 67 STAN. L. REV. ONLINE 59 (2014), http://www.stanford
lawreview.org/wp-content/uploads/sites/3/2014/11/67 Stan L Rev Online 59 AdamsBannore.pdf
[https://perma.cc/MJ85-YXS9] (reviewing Hobby Lobby's treatment of religious sincerity but only
noting that religiously heterogeneous corporations create a difficult question).
9 See infra Part I.A.
10573 U.S. at 717 18.
SId. at 718.
12 See infra Part II.B.
13 See Masterpiece Cakeshop, Ltd. v. Colo. Civil Rights Comm'n 138 S. Ct. 1719, 1720 (2018)
(focusing only on Jack Phillips' religious beliefs); Hobby Lobby, 573 U.S. at 720 (noting that the
claimants all share "a sincere religious belief that life begins at conception").
14 See Hobby Lobby, 573 U.S. at 718 19 (allowing for the possibility of religious exemption
claims when shareholders disagree and refusing to rule out public corporations claiming exemptions);
see also Lyman Johnson & David Millon, Corporate Law After Hobby Lobby, 70 BUS. LAW. 1, 26
27 (2015) (arguing shareholder unanimity is not required under Hobby Lobby).
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sincere and insincere at the same time. Although it is interesting to ponder this
duality in the abstract, the reality of corporate exemptions must produce a single
answer-the corporation is either allowed to claim the exemption or it is not.
Once religiously heterogeneous corporations are introduced, religious
sincerity takes on a new dimension. The courts must determine whose sincerity
should be attributed to the corporation for purposes of the exemption. It may
be tempting to simply apply existing state corporate law rules regarding corpo-
rate control to the question of attribution. 15 Although this solution avoids any
claim that states are discriminating against religious exercise, mechanically
applying state law and attributing to the corporation the beliefs of the share-
holder who has control over the underlying religious practice leads to unsatis-
factory results. 16 State corporate law is largely defined by permissive private
ordering that allows shareholders to customize their business through contract-
ing to optimize the value of the enterprise for all participants. 17 Corporate
law's commitment to the freedom to contract has implications both for corpo-
rations where (1) a dissenting shareholder wishes to prevent the controlling
shareholder from claiming an exemption on behalf of the corporation, and (2)
assenting agnostic shareholders are willing to bargain with religious share-
holders to allow the latter to claim an exemption. ' 8
In cases involving dissenting shareholders, corporate law is generally re-
luctant to step in to mediate claims of unfairness by minority shareholders,
unless the controlling shareholder is thwarting the minority's reasonable ex-
pectations of profit. 19 In certain circumstances, because corporate law locks the
dissenting shareholders' capital investment in the company, this reluctance
could force dissenting shareholders to practice the majority's religion via their
investment in the corporation, even if it conflicts with their own religious be-
15 The majority inHobby Lobby suggested that applying state corporate law would be the appro-
priate course of action. 573 U.S. at 719 (noting that courts should look to the corporation's governing
structure and "underlying state law" to resolve disputes between shareholders). Some scholars have
echoed this language. See Chapman, supra note 8, at 1240 ("[R]esponsibility for sincerity would seem
to belong to whomever the law assigns authority to determine the institution's religious 'beliefs."').
16 See infra Part II.C (describing the harm to third parties from greatly increased exemptions and
the damage that monetizing religious sincerity could do to religious liberty in the courts and the pub-
lic's perception).
17 See Pollman, supra note 7, at 651 (describing the development of corporate law and permissive
contracting).
" This Article uses the term "assenting agnostic shareholder" to refer to a shareholderwho does
not share the other shareholders' religious convictions but sees the corporation's religion as simply
another bargaining chip to be used in negotiating for corporate benefits and control.
19 See D. Gordon Smith, The Shareholder Primacy Norm, 23 J. CoRP. L. 277, 318 22 (1998)
(discussing the shareholder primacy norm in the context of minority-oppression cases). Because cor-
porate law is largely a matter of state law, the protections afforded to minority shareholders vary by
state. See infra Part M.A.
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liefs. 20 To avoid this dilemma, the law should either require unanimous share-
holder agreement to claim a religious exemption or provide an exit mechanism
for dissenting shareholders to remove their capital investment from the corpo-
21ration.
Using corporate control to determine attribution for corporations with as-
senting agnostic shareholders is even more problematic. Corporate law's
commitment to the freedom of contract would allow parties to monetize reli-
gious sincerity in ways that undermine religious liberty. Take, for example, a
religious investor with a sincere belief that his religion compels him to use his
investments in startups to prevent as many corporations as possible from en-
gaging in practices his religion deems sinful-such as providing contraceptive
coverage.2 2 This religious investor could offer an entrepreneur seed funding in
exchange for a class of shares amounting to a small equity interest in the com-
pany. The equity interest could provide him the contractual right to determine
whether the employees of the corporation receive contraceptive coverage in
their health plan. As the company grows, the religious investor's share of the
company shrinks even more, but he retains control over the religious practice
at issue for the exemption. If control equates to attribution, the religious share-
holder would be the only shareholder equired to demonstrate religious inceri-
ty-a burden he could meet. The entrepreneur will have received funding, and
the religious shareholder will have successfully fulfilled his religious mission
by purchasing the right to prevent a corporation from engaging in what he be-
lieves to be sinful behavior.
Corporate law would not take umbrage, but rather, it would celebrate such
a bargain, as this contracting allows the parties to monetize a new feature of
corporate control-religious sincerity.23 This result, however, is less in keeping
with the value of religious liberty. It could lead to widespread exemptions, re-
20 See infra Part III.A.1.
21 See infra Part III.A.2.
22 This scenario is not farfetched. Two major Christian denominations have actively encouraged
their parishioners to run their businesses in accordance with their faith, including seeking religious
exemptions to change cultural norms. See Douglas NeJaime & Reva B. Siegel, Conscience Wars:
Complicity-Based Conscience Claims in Religion and Politics, 124 YALE L.J. 2516, 2548 (2015)
(documenting movement by certain churches "to enforce traditional morality in the law of abortion
and marriage and to seek conscience-based exemptions from laws that depart from traditional morali-
ty"). This movement is already inthe venture financing space. See infra note 178 and accompanying
text. In addition, the Catholic Church routinely contracts to ensure its religious practices are continued
in the healthcare corporations with which it affiliates, oftentimes even long after the religious affilia-
tion ends. See generally Elizabeth Sepper, Zombie Religious Institutions, 112 NW. U. L. REV. 929
(2018).
23 See Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, The Corporate Contract, 89 COLUM. L. REV.
1416, 1432 (1989) ("It turns out to be hard to find any interesting item [of corporate control] that does
not have an influence on price.").
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suiting in increased harm to third parties. Perhaps even more troubling, the
monetizing of religious sincerity would likely lead to the perception that reli-
gious beliefs are a commodity like any other, diminishing the value of religious
liberty both in the eyes of the courts and the public at large.24
A different test for attribution is needed. Given the virtually infinite set of
combinations of corporate ownership and control, the question of attribution is
necessarily a multifactored inquiry into not just the number of religious versus
agnostic shareholders, but also into each shareholder's ownership and control
interests, and the religious practices of the corporation itself 25 The stunning di-
versity of corporate structures makes bright-line rules difficult to draw without
being both over- and under-inclusive.26 The alternative is a balancing test that
weighs the factors of shareholder number, ownership, control, and corporate
practice to determine whether the corporation should be considered sincere giv-
en the relative interest of the religious shareholders on each metric. Determining
how to balance these factors for attribution requires more thoughtful considera-
tion than the Supreme Court has yet given to the ultimate question of what exact-
ly gives a corporation the right to exercise religion. The contours of any eventual
tests for attribution may depend largely on whether the doctrine for attribution is
developed by the federal courts, the states, or both. The question of proper at-
tribution combines the determination of religious sincerity with the secular reali-
ties of private contracting in corporate law. Although the former is generally the
province of the federal courts, the latter falls squarely within the power of states
to define corporate purpose and structure.27
This Article proceeds in three Parts. Part I reviews the existing law and
literature on religious sincerity for individuals and details how the process of
determining the veracity of shareholders' religious beliefs largely tracks the
preexisting doctrine.28 Part II identifies the additional attribution inquiry nec-
essary to determine corporate sincerity and explores why a mechanical appli-
cation of corporate law's control rules is a poor fit with the values underlying
religious sincerity.29 Part III provides a framework for determining questions
of corporate attribution for corporations with religiously heterogeneous hare-
holders. It considers the question of attribution for both corporations with dis-
senting shareholders and corporations with assenting agnostic shareholders and
24 See infra Part II.C.
25 See infra Part III.B.2.
26 In addition, bright-line rules have the potential to provide a roadmap for monetizing religious
sincerity by alerting parties to the minimum contracting necessary to guarantee a finding of religious
sincerity. See infra note 270 and accompanying text.
27 See infra Part III.C.
28 See infra Part I.
29 See infra Part II.
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lays out a series of factors for courts to consider, including control, financial
interest, number of shareholders, and corporate action. After considering the
merits of crafting bright-line rules or a balancing test using these factors, it
reaches the conclusion that the ability to contract for religious exemptions
should be greatly limited. Finally, Part III concludes with a discussion on
whether states or the federal courts should define the test for attribution.30
I. VERACITY AND CORPORATE RELIGIOUS SINCERITY
Determining whether a party claiming a religious accommodation is sin-
cere in their religious beliefs has long been a fraught endeavor for academics
and courts.31 Although some scholars argue that courts should simply avoid the
question, the law has developed a framework to analyze religious sincerity fo-
cused on the veracity with which the claimant holds their beliefs rather than
the accuracy of such beliefs.32 The introduction of religious exemptions for
corporate entities did not require great changes to the existing doctrine regard-
ing veracity, in large part because the petitioners' religious sincerity was not
questioned.33 The Court still discussed sincerity, but rather than focusing on
the corporation, the Court evaluated the sincerity of the shareholders' religious
beliefs, including the religious imperative to run one's business in accordance
with one's religious beliefs.
34
A. Individual Religious Sincerity
Defining the nature of religion and, in turn, what constitutes religious in-
cerity within a legal framework has long challenged scholars.35 Religion is
30 See infra Part III.
31 See Chapman, supra note 8, at 1188 89 (describing the history of doctrinal and scholarly work
relating to adjudicating religious sincerity).
32 See Stephanie H. Barclay & Mark L. Rienzi, ConstitutionalAnomalies orAs-Applied Chal
lenges?A Defense ofReligious Exemptions, 59 B.C. L. REv. 1595, 1645 (2018) (differentiating free-
dom of religion from freedom of speech in that religious objectors must prove their religious sincerity
to receive protection, whereas peakers do not have to prove that they actually believe what they say);
Chapman, supra note 8, at 1201 02 (describing the doctrine but noting "many scholars remain uneasy
with the Court's conclusion"); infra Part I.A.
33 Hobby Lobby, 573 U.S. at 717 (noting that "no one has disputed the sincerity of [petitioners']
religious beliefs"); see also Masterpiece Cakeshop, 138 S. Ct. at 1723 (noting that the bakerwas mo-
tivated by "his sincere religious beliefs").
34 Hobby Lobby, 573 U.S. at 701 (describing the Hahns' belief in running their business "in ac-
cordance with their religious beliefs"); id. at 703 (describing the Greens' similar beliefs); see infra
Part I.B.
35 See, e.g., Kent Greenawalt, Judicial Resolution ofIssues AboutReligious Conviction, 81 MARQ.
L. REv. 461, 463 65 (1998) (analyzing various aspects of religiousness in theory and practice); Anna
Su, Judging Religious Sincerity, 5 OXFORD J.L. & RELIGION 28, 28 n.1 (2016) (listing a "micro-
sampling of the gargantuan academic effort" to define religion in the law).
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multifaceted, and the role it plays in the life of believers varies. 36 Due to its
perceived importance to the human experience, religion is given a special
place and special protection in our legal system. 37 Religious accommodations
or exemptions to neutrally applicable laws have been available through the
Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment,38 as well as for certain federal
laws under the Religious Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA)39 and the Religious
Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act (RLUIPA). 40 Such protections ne-
cessitate some inquiry by the courts into what constitutes religion and religious
belief All religious accommodations require the plaintiff to show sincere reli-
gious beliefs. 41 The sheer breadth and diversity of religious beliefs and practic-
es, however, raises the omnipresent specter that courts may incorrectly deem
unusual or unorthodox beliefs insincere.42 As such, several justices and numer-
ous scholars have advocated that courts should refrain from inquiring into the
religious sincerity of parties.43
36 Greenawalt, supra note 35, at 463-64 (describing three different kinds of "religiousness"); Su,
supra note 35, at 28 (noting that religion can be "a belief, a form of identity, and a way of life").
17 Christopher C. Lund, Religion Is Special Enough, 103 VA. L. REv. 481,481(2017) ("In ways
almost beyond counting, our legal system treats religion differently, subjecting it both to certain pro-
tections and certain disabilities."). There is, however, a recent movement among scholars questioning
whether religion deserves a special place in the law. See generally Micah Schwartzman, What if Reli-
gion Is Not Special?, 79 U. CHI. L. REv. 1351 (2012) (noting that the law treats religion as special but
questioning the justifications for such treatment).
38 Although, such claims were limited by the Court's controversial decision inEmploymentDivi-
sion Department of Human Resources of Oregon v. Smith. 494 U.S. 872, 872 83 (1990). The majority
and concurring opinions inMasterpiece Cakeshop have placed Smith's continuing viability into doubt.
See Masterpiece Cakeshop, 138 S. Ct. at 1719-40; Beery, supra note 6, at 121.
'9 Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000bb 2000bb-4 (2018).
4' Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act of 2000, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000cc 2000cc-5
(2018).
41 See Chapman, supra note 8, at 1187 ("The rule is simple: to qualify for a religious accommoda-
tion, a claimant must demonstrate sincerity."); see also Holt v. Hobbs, 574 U.S. 352, 360 63 (2015)
(holding that RLUIPA requires sincerity); Hobby Lobby, 573 U.S. at 717 n.28 ("To qualify for
RFRA's protection, an asserted belief must be 'sincere'....").
42 See Su, supra note 35, at 42 (noting that "if a religion seems incredulous or is not at all familiar
to a judge then it [could] evoke skepticism and therefore, less protection").
41 Justice Jackson most famously opposed adjudicating religious sincerity in the context of a
fraud conviction for claims of spiritual healing. United States v. Ballard, 322 U.S. 78, 92 95 (1944)
(Jackson, J., dissenting); see also Chapman, supra note 8, at 1206 10 (analyzing Justice Jackson's
objection to inquiring into the religious sincerity). More recently, Justice Ginsburg's dissent inHobby
Lobby stated that the courts should stay "out of the business of evaluating" religious sincerity. 573
U.S. at 771 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (quoting United States v. Lee, 455 U.S. 252, 263 (1982) (Ste-
vens, J., concurring)). Many scholars share this view or see adjudication of religious sincerity as a
necessary evil. See Ira C. Lupu, Where Rights Begin: The Problem ofBurdens on the Free Exercise of
Religion, 102 HARV. L. REV. 933, 957 (1989); Mark Tushnet, Accommodation ofReligion Thirty
Years On, 38 HARV. J.L. & GENDER 1, 10 (2015) (discussing the danger of "feigned" religious beliefs
that take advantage of accommodations); see also Chapman, supra note 8, at 1189 (noting this is the
"mainstream view among legal scholars"). See generally Ronald J. Krotoszynski, Jr., The Apostle,
1772 [Vol. 61:1763
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Despite this theoretical confusion, the courts must create and, in fact,
have created workable rules to determine religious sincerity.44 In cases involv-
ing "strong incentive[s] to feign religious sincerity" to claim a beneficial ex-
emption, courts have been willing to consider "any fact which casts doubt on
the veracity of the" claimant. 45 A financial windfall or other secular motive for
accommodation can provide evidence of insincerity.46 Further, the claimant's
own statements or behaviors that are inconsistent with the claimant's purported
beliefs, or even a lack of "fit" between the purported belief and the "claimant's
religious narrative," can provide additional evidence of a phony claim. 47 Such
determinations regarding witness credibility and whether a party is fraudulent-
ly claiming religious beliefs are firmly within the courts' expertise.
48
Although courts must adjudicate religious sincerity, to avoid imposing or-
thodoxy on religious claimants, they should focus not on the accuracy of a re-
ligious tenet but, rather, on the sincerity of the claimant's belief in that tenet.49
Stated differently, the court should not consider "whether a religious claim is
Mr. Justice Jackson, and the "Pathological Perspective" of the Free Exercise Clause, 65 WASH. &
LEEL. REv. 1071 (2008).
44 See Chapman, supra note 8, at 1201 ("In the course of making and enforcing law.... the gov-
ernment cannot avoid deciding matters that touch on religion and religious beliefs."); Su, supra note
35, at 33 (noting that "courts must discharge theirjudicial duty and sometimes decide and define what
is religion for the purpose of protecting its exercise").
45 Adams & Barmore, supra note 8, at 60 (quoting Witmer v. United States, 348 U.S. 375, 381
(1955)). Insincere claims motivated by profit or other secular goals have been found in a variety of
contexts from exemptions to military service or drug laws to fraudulent transfers inbankruptcy. Id. at
60 62.
46 See Chapman, supra note 8, at 1231 32 (describing cases involving ulterior motives for ex-
emptions). Although ulterior motives canbe evidence of insincerity, the fact that an individual is mo-
tivated by both religious sincerity and an additional motive (such as profit or secular beliefs) should
not defeat the religious sincerity of her claim. Id. at 1233.
47 Id. at 1234 37 (detailing cases where courts found claimants insincere due to evidence that
their statements to the Court were not truthful based on previous actions or statements). Evidence of
"inconsistencies between a litigant's purported beliefs and his behavior" is more debatable because
people often "fail[] to live up to [their] religious ideals." Adams & Barmore, supra note 8, at 63. Even
so, actions can be "strongly probative of sincerity." Id.
48 See Adams & Barmore, supra note 8, at 63 64 ("Claims of religious sincerity are ultimately
questions of fact, and courts have a wealth of experience weighing witness credibility.") (footnote
omitted).
49 See id. at 64 (identifying the risk that courts might conflate sincerity and orthodoxy). For ex-
ample, the petitioners in Hobby Lobby believed that the contraceptives at issue were abortifacients.
573 U.S. at 691. The medical profession, however, agrees that the contraceptives are not abortifa-
cients, even taking into account the petitioners' own definition of when life begins. See Jen Gunter,
The Medical Facts AboutBirth Control andHobby Lobby From an OB/GYN, NEWREPUBLIC (July
6, 2014), https://newrepublic.com/article/1 8547/facts-about-birth-control-and-hobby-lobby-ob-gyn
[https://perma.cc/X5UC-MDHN] (summarizing scientific conclusions about contraceptive methods at
issue in HobbyLobby). That professional conclusion is irrelevant to the analysis of whether petitioners
actually believed them to be abortifacients.
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'true,"' but it should determine "whether the claimant 'truly' believes it."'50 De-
spite these efforts, some slippage between the two is likely inevitable, in part
because it is easier to believe the claimant is sincere about a religious practice
familiar to the factfinder. 51
Although the dangers of orthodoxy slipping into the courts' sincerity
analysis should not be ignored, there are good reasons to take seriously the
need to ferret out insincere religious claims. Insincere religious claims are in-
evitable, especially when there are benefits to be gained from religious ac-
commodation.52 Allowing religious fraud to remove regulatory burdens on a
claimant is rent-seeking behavior that should not be countenanced.53 In addi-
tion, religious accommodation involves a "trade-off of public goods" where
accommodation "is exchanged for administrative complication, financial costs,
and, in some cases, increased burdens on others.54 In the case of claims in-
volving exemptions based on the claimant's alleged complicity in the sinful
acts of others, the harm to third parties is especially acute. Such complicity-
based conscience claims do not involve direct actions by the claimant but, ra-
ther, the claimant's belief that a third party's lawful conduct is sinful.55 Com-
plicity-based claims, thus, necessarily involve a claimant asking to shift the
burden of their religious practice onto a third party for whom the regulation
was designed to protect.56
51 Chapman, supra note 8, at 1202; see also id. at 1226 ("[A]ccuracy depends onthe statement's
correspondence to observable reality external to the speaker[,]" whereas "[s]incerity depends on the
statement's correspondence to the speaker's subjective belief").
51 Id. at 1229 ("The more implausible a factfinder believes the religious belief to be, the harder it
will be for the factfinderto conclude that the claimant actually believes it."); Su, supra note 35, at 41
4 2 . -52 See Chapman, supra note 8, at 1211 (noting that "religious hucksters have longbeen a staple of
the American experience").
51 See id. (discussing the costs of disregarding sincere religious beliefs as a method to protect
against religious insincerity).
54 Id. at 1214; see also Kathleen A. Brady, Religious Accommodations and Third-Party Harms:
Constitutional Values andLimits, 106 KY. L.J. 717,719 (2017) ("The impact of religious accommo-
dations on others will affect decisions about whether to adopt an accommodation and the scope and
form it will take.").
55 NeJaime & Siegel, supra note 22, at 2519. For example, in Hobby Lobby, the petitioners did
not claim that the law forced them to use certain contraception. Rather, they objected to paying for
insurance that some employees might use to fill a prescription for contraception that petitioners be-
lieved to be sinful. 573 U.S. at 691.
56 See NeJaime & Siegel, supra note 22, at 2527 ("Complicity-based conscience claims are ori-
ented toward third parties who do not share the claimant's beliefs about the conduct in question. For
this reason, their accommodation has distinctive potential to impose material and dignitary harm on
those the claimants condemn."); Amy J. Sepinwall, Conscience and Complicity: Assessing Pleasfor
Religious Exemptions in Hobby Lobby 's Wake, 82 U. CHI. L. REV. 1897, 1973 (2015) (arguing that
courts should focus on third-party harms in complicity-based claims).
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Equally troubling, the failure to take seriously questions of religious sin-
cerity may have doctrinal implications. If ajudge is suspicious of the claim-
ant's religious sincerity but cannot adjudicate the issue overtly, the suspicion
will likely creep into the other elements of the accommodation analysis, mak-
ing bad law for future claimants.57 In addition, insincere claims may directly
affect another component of the accommodation analysis-whether the gov-
ernment can show that the regulation is the least restrictive means of achieving
a compelling government interest. To meet its burden, the government may
demonstrate that the number of legitimate or illegitimate demands for accom-
modation would undermine the regulation at issue.58 Thus, the specter of a
flood of insincere claims for exemptions may provide the government with
justification to deny sincere claims. 59 Finally, "[w]hen the government gives a
pass to those who insincerely claim the benefits of religious liberty, it erodes
the value of that liberty in the eyes of the public., 60 These concerns make it
necessary to carefully consider questions of religious sincerity.
B. Hobby Lobby, Masterpiece Cakeshop, and Corporate Veracity
The Supreme Court has introduced corporate religious rights into this mi-
lieu and, along with them, the need to determine corporate religious sincerity. In
Hobby Lobby, the Supreme Court granted religious exemptions under RFRA to
three corporations seeking to avoid some aspects of the Affordable Care Act's
(ACA) contraceptive mandate.61 The Court notes that each corporation is owned
and operated by members of families who share the same sincerely held reli-
gious beliefs. The Green family "own[s] and operate [s]" and "retain[s] exclusive
control" over Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc. and Mardel, Inc., two companies incor-
porated in Oklahoma.62 Both companies were operated through a management
trust controlled by the Green family.63 Members of the Hahn family "exercise
sole ownership" of Conestoga Wood Specialties, Inc., a Pennsylvania corpora-
57 See Chapman_ supra note 8, at 1216 ("[S]uspicion creep can have the unintended effect of
perverting a court's articulation of the requirements for a religious accommodation claim, making it
harder for sincere claimants in future cases to state a claim.").
58 See id. at 1221 22.
51 See id.
6 Id. at 1222 (noting a popular comedian who parodied prosperous churches and arguing that
"the misperception that religious liberty entails the protection of phony religious claims undermines
public support for the protection of sincere ones").
61 573 U.S. at 690 91.
6 2 
Id. at 702.
63 Id. at 703 n. 15. This management trust is in itself an example of a contract to ensure religious
continuity regardless of the sincerity of existing shareholders, as it requires the corporationto continue
as its "religious identity," "even after the company's founder and family patriarch steps down." See
Sepper, supra note 22, at 958 59.
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tion, and the family "control[s] its board of directors and hold[s] all of its voting
shares.64
In Masterpiece Cakeshop, Ltd. v. Colorado Civil Rights Commission, the
Court heard the free exercise claim of Jack Phillips and Masterpiece Cakeshop,
Ltd., who were seeking an exemption to Colorado's anti-discrimination stat-
ute. 65 In its opinion, the Court entirely ignores the corporate party to the litiga-
tion. The Court never mentions the corporate party, not even its state of incor-
poration, other than to say that it is "operated" by its owner, Jack Phillips.
66
Throughout the opinion, the corporate party is simply referred to as a "bakery"
or a "shop" and is discussed only in relation to Jack Phillips.67 In fact, Master-
piece Cakeshop is a corporation incorporated in the state of Colorado and has
an additional shareholder-Jack's wife, Debra Phillips-who is never men-
tioned in the Court's opinion.68 The Court's failure to acknowledge the corpo-
rate party makes it arguable that the Court did not conclusively establish a free
exercise right for corporations. Given the haphazard way the Court has histori-
cally bestowed constitutional rights on corporations, however, there is reason
to believe future decisions may treat corporate religious free exercise as afait
accompli.69 As such, the Court's treatment-or lack thereof-of the corpora-
tion's religious sincerity may provide a useful data point.
64 Hobby Lobby, 573 U.S. at 70041.
65 138 S. Ct. 1719, 1719 (2018). The Court did not determine whether the plaintiff qualified foran
exemption, resolving the case on the grounds of state animus towards religion in the administrative deci-
sionbelow. Id. at 1724. Despite never referencing the corporate party, the Court's unusual remedy to the
animus claim gave Masterpiece Cakeshop its requested exemption. Id. at 1732 (reversingjudgment inits
entirety); see also Chad Flanders & Sean Oliveira, An Incomplete Masterpiece, 66 UCLA L. REV. DIS-
COURSE 154, 175 (2019), https://www.uclalawreview.org/an-incomplete-masterpiece/ [https://penna.
cc/X5TJ-2HAJ] (noting the unusual remedy served as a "windfall" to Phillips).66 Masterpiece Cakeshop, 138 S. Ct. at 1724.
61 See, e.g., id. at 1723, 1724 (describing Masterpiece Cakeshop as "a bakery in Colorado," and
noting, "Jack Phillips is an expert baker who has owned and operated the shop for 24 years").
68 Brief for Petitioners at ii, Masterpiece Cakeshop, 138 S. Ct. 1719 (No. 16-111), 2017 WL
3913762, at *ii.
69 See Adam Winkler, Masterpiece Cakeshop 's Surprising Breadth, SLATE (June 6, 2018, 10:29
AM), https://slate.com/news-and-politics/2018/06/masterpiece-cakeshop-grants-constitutional-religious-
liberty-rights-to-corporations.html [https://perma.cc/5N74-M6CZ] (arguing that Masterpiece Cakeshop
will likely become precedent granting Free Exercise rights to corporations). In Santa Clara County v.
Southern Pacific Railroad Co., the Supreme Court famously created similar precedent hrough impli-
cation. 118 U.S. 394 (1886). The Court granted Fourteenth Amendment rights to corporations via a
court reporter documenting "a comment from the bench to that effect inthe headnotes to the opinion."
Pollman, supra note 7, at 659. The headnote was then used as precedent and forms the basis for the
due process rights of corporations. Id.
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1. Whose Sincerity Is Relevant?
The question of whose sincerity is relevant is a necessary precursor to the
question of what beliefs a petitioner must claim for a corporation to be granted
an exemption. Is it the religious sincerity of the corporation itself or some (or
all) of the humans involved in the corporation?70 By disregarding the corporate
entity, Hobby Lobby and Masterpiece Cakeshop make it clear that shareholders
are the relevant subjects of the sincerity analysis.71 The majority in Hobby
Lobby disregards the corporate entity to focus on the shareholders as individu-
als using the corporation for their religious ends.72 The religious freedom at
stake is the religion of the shareholders, not the corporation.73 Religious sincer-
ity is based on those who "own and operate" the corporation.74 The Court in
Hobby Lobby never ascribes religious beliefs or religious sincerity to the cor-
poration itself.7l Instead, the beliefs are attributed to the various shareholders
76
of the corporations.
Rather than viewing religious rights as being held and exercised by the
corporation itself, Hobby Lobby is better understood as allowing individuals to
7' There is an existing test to determine the religious sincerity of an entity itself, but it has rejected
the claim that a for-profit entity can be sufficiently religious to qualify as a religious entity. See infra
notes 143 146 and accompanying text.
71 The problems inherent in the Court's decision to disregard the corporate entity and focus on
shareholders are well documented by many corporate scholars. See infra note 78 and accompanying
text. Given the Court's composition, however, a change in direction seems unlikely. Rather than en-
couraging reversal, this Article attempts to work within the parameters set by the Court thus far.
7
2 See 573 U.S. at 706 ("[Ilt is important to keep in mind that the purpose of [the corporation] is
to provide protection of human beings.").
71 See id. at 683 84 ("Protecting the free-exercise rights of closely held corporations ... protects
the religious liberty of the humans who own and control them."). Althoughthe Court initially included
officers and employees in the rights-holding individuals who fall under the corporate umbrella, they
drop out of the equation almost immediately. See Eric W. Orts, Theorizing the Firm: Organizational
Ontology in the Supreme Court, 65 DEPAUL L. REv. 559, 588 (2016) ("What happened to the rights
of employees when the topic of religion within the firm arose? They simply appear to have been ig-
nored.").
74 See, e.g., Hobby Lobby, 573 U.S. at 717 (noting that the companies are "each owned and con-
trolled by members of a single family, and no one has disputed the sincerity of their religious be-
liefs").
75 See Catherine A. Hardee, Who 's Causing the Harm?, 106 KY. L.J. 751, 774 75 (2018) (detail-
ing attribution of religious beliefs to the individuals but that "nowhere in the opinion does the Court so
clearly ascribe a belief system to Hobby Lobby or Conestoga").
76 See, e.g., Hobby Lobby, 573 U.S. at 689 90 (noting religious sincerity, "the sincerely held
religious beliefs of the companies' owners"); id. at 691 (noting religious beliefs, "[t]he owners of the
businesses have religious objections to abortion ... [; i]fthe owners comply with the HHS mandate,
they believe they will be facilitating abortions, and if they do not comply, they will pay a very heavy
price"); id. at 720 (noting religious beliefs, "the Hahns and Greens have a sincere religious belief that
life begins at conception").
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use a corporation to further their personal religious beliefs. 77 The corporation
is merely a conduit for expressing the shareholders' religion, rather than an
entity standing apart from the shareholders with its own religious identity. 
78
One reading of the opinion is that the Court is willing to allow corporations to
exercise religion when there is justification to ignore the corporate existence
and focus directly on the individual shareholders. The Court is not making dis-
tinctions between or among corporations regarding which qualify for exemp-
tions, but, rather, it is determining eligibility by the way the use of the corpora-
tion is related to the religious sincerity of the human beings involved.
This reading explains why the Court in Hobby Lobby refused to categori-
cally rule out any type of corporation as capable of exercising religion. There
are formal distinctions between types of corporations in corporate law-such
as for-profit, nonprofit, benefit corporations, and religious corporations. The
Court explicitly rejected these categories a a relevant metric for determining
eligibility for exemptions.79 The only category the Court did endorse-closely
held corporations-is problematic.8 ° First, the term "closely held" does not
have a universal definition.8 Second, although some states do define closely
held corporations, this formal distinction is unlikely to be outcome determina-
tive, as it would include corporations that would be unlikely to qualify for reli-
gious exemptions-such as venture-capital-backed startups.82 In addition, the
77 See Catherine A. Hardee, VeilPiercing and the Untapped Power ofState Courts, 94 WASH. L.
REv. 217, 250 (2019) (arguing the opinion disregards the corporate entity to allow shareholders to
exercise their personal religion); Gregory A. Mark, Hobby Lobby and Corporate Personhood: Taking
the U S. Supreme Court ' Reasoning at Face Value, 65 DEPAUL L. REv. 535, 541 (2016) (noting that
the corporations "exist solely as vehicles" for the shareholders rights).
78 Corporate law scholars have criticized this aspect of the decision as being at odds with the
fundamental principle of corporate law that the corporation is an entity separate from its shareholders.
See, e.g., Elizabeth Pollman, Corporate Law and Theory in Hobby Lobby, in THE RISE OF CORPO-
RATE RELIGIOUS LIBERTY 149, 157 (Micah Schwartzman et al. eds., 2016); Robert M. Ackerman &
Lance Cole, Making Corporate Law More Communitarian: A Proposed Response to the Roberts
Court's Personification of Corporations, 81 BROOK. L. REv. 895, 948 (2016); Mark, supra note 77, at
540; Thomas E. Rutledge,A Corporation Has No Soul The Business Entity Law Response to Chal-
lenges to the PPACA Contraceptive Mandate, 5 WM. & MARY BUS. L. REV. 1, 17 18 (2014).
7' Hobby Lobby, 573 U.S. at 708 (noting that "person" cannot mean "some but not all corpora-
tions"); id. at 709 10 (rejecting profit motive as disqualifying); id. at 685 (describing the limit on
public companies claiming exemptions as practical, not categorical).
8o See id. at 719 ("[W]e hold that a federal regulation's restriction on the activities of a for-profit
closely held corporation must comply with RFRA.").
81 See Pollman, supra note 78, at 164 (noting that there is no single definition for closely held
corporation in corporate law and that the Court utilizes a "general understanding" of the term).
82 See, e.g., CAL. CORP. CODE § 158 (West 2019) (defining a "close corporation" as one with
thirty-five or fewer shareholders, a statement in the articles of incorporation that it is a close corpora-
tion, and compliance with provisions in Section 202). Venture capital startups would be unlikely to
pass the Hobby Lobby test, given that they are generally composed of a disassociated group of profit-
driven investors who fund a large variety of businesses. See Patrick J. Kennan & Christiana Ochoa,
The Human Rights Potential of Sovereign Wealth Funds, 40 GEO. J. INT'L L. 1151, 1168 (2009)
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Court leaves open the possibility that a public corporation could qualify if the
practical hurdles were overcome.8 3 Thus, the relevant question is not whether the
corporation is sincere but, rather, whether the use of the corporation demon-
strates a sincere exercise of religion by the appropriate corporate participants.
Disregard for the corporate entity is even clearer in Masterpiece
Cakeshop because the corporation is literally absent in the opinion, despite
receiving the relief it sought.8 4 Although the Court did not require a finding
that either Jack Phillips or Masterpiece Cakeshop was incere in order to hold
that the Commission was not acting with religious neutrality,8 5 it repeatedly
articulated Jack Phillips' sincerity in his religious beliefs.8 6
The argument that the Court views individual shareholders as the appro-
priate subjects of the sincerity inquiry is further supported by the Court's con-
clusion in Hobby Lobby that, in enacting RFRA, Congress did not intend to
"discriminate" against people based on how they choose to run their busi-
ness.8 7 Despite this language, the Hobby Lobby decision clarifies that not all
corporations will be able to claim religious exemptions.8 The Court expressed
its holding as limited "to closely held corporations.8 9 In the opinion, the Court
limits eligibility even further by taking pains to clarify why the corporations at
issue qualify for an exemption even beyond their status as a "closely held cor-
poration," focusing on the number of shareholders, the shareholders' control
("Venture capital firms are enterprises that use funds received from outsiders to invest in entrepre-
neurial ventures.").
83 HobbyLobby, 573 U. S. at 685 (noting that "numerous practical restraints would likely prevent"
public companies from asserting RFRA claims).
84 The Court's holding set aside the Commissioner's actions. Masterpiece Cakeshop, 138 S. Ct. at
1724. This included its order against Masterpiece Cakeshop. Id. at 1732 (reversing the Colorado Court
of Appeals without limitation).
8
5 Id. at 1731 (holding that "the Commission's treatment of Phillips' case violated the State's duty
under the First Amendment").
8 6 
See, e.g., id. at 1723 ("The reason and motive for the baker's refusal were based on his sincere
religious beliefs and convictions."); id. at 1724 (detailing Phillips' religious beliefs); id. at 1728 (de-
tailing how Phillips' work intersects with his "deep and sincere religious beliefs"). Althoughthe Court
does not place any emphasis on the particular nature of the corporation at issue in the case, it seems
unlikely that the Court would allow a publicly held supermarket corporation to claim a religious ex-
emption.
87 573 U.S. at 691 (rejecting argument hat the form ofbusiness determines whether RFRA claims
are available).
88 Id. at 691 93. Such distinctions are in stark contrast o the speech rights granted to corporations
in Citizens United v. Federal Election Commission, where the Court went out of its way to grant free
speech rights to all corporations. 558 U.S. 310, 365 (2010). Although presented with a narrow as-
applied challenge by a non-profit corporation, the Court broadly held that the campaign finance re-
strictions at issue were facially invalid for all corporations, including public, for-profit entities. Id. ; see
Jonathan Macey & Leo E. Strine, Jr., Citizens United as Bad Corporate Law, 2019 Wis. L. REV. 451,
459 (discussing the voluntarily broad nature of the Court's holding).
89Hobby Lobby, 573 U.S. at 736.
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interests and sincere beliefs, and the religious actions taken by the corpora-
tion.90 Certain types of corporations-namely public corporations and those
with dissenting minority shareholders-are singled out as potentially unlikely
to qualify for exemptions.91 In the end, the majority explicitly rejects the dis-
sent's concern that their holding will lead to widespread exemptions by for-
profit corporations. 
92
Any distinctions between corporations are, at first blush, somewhat per-
plexing, as the underlying issue in the case was whether corporations fall under
the definition of "a person" under RFRA.93 In its analysis, the Court heavily
relies on the Dictionary Act's definition of "person," that includes "corpora-
tions, companies, associations, firms, partnerships, societies, and joint stock
companies, as well as individuals." 94 Despite this, the Court fails to note any-
thing in the Dictionary Act that would suggest that some corporations consti-
tute "persons" whereas others do not. Recognition that the human sharehold-
ers, not the corporation itself, are the subject of the Court's sincerity inquiry
harmonizes the apparent disconnect between the rejection of "discrimination"
against and between corporations and the Court's potential limitation of reli-
gious exemptions to a subset of for-profit corporations.
2. What Sincerity Is Required?
Notwithstanding the fact that the government did not contest the Hahns'
and Greens' religious sincerity, it did dispute whether it is possible to "ascer-
tain the sincere 'beliefs' of a corporation," especially one with religiously het-
erogeneous shareholders. 95 Although the government's argument is better read
as identifying the difficulty in determining whose beliefs will be attributed to
the corporate entity,96 the Court provided a mixed response, alternating be-
tween the issue of attribution and a more traditional sincerity analysis.97 The
9oId. at 718; see Jennifer S. Taub, Is Hobby Lobby a Toolfor Limiting Corporate Constitutional
Rights?, 30 CONST. COMMENT. 403, 419 20 (2015) (describing the apparent corporate attributes nec-
essary to qualify for exemptions).
91 Hobby Lobby, 573 U.S. at 718 19 (indicating it is up to state law to determine which corpora-
tions with dissenting shareholders may claim exemptions); id. at 685 (noting that, as a practical mat-
ter, public corporations are unlikely to qualify for exemptions).
92 Id. at 705 (rejecting that their holding will allow "for-profit corporations and other commercial
enterprises" to "opt out of any law ... they judge incompatible with their sincerely held religious
beliefs") (internal quotations omitted).
93 Id.
94 Id. at 707 08 (quoting the Dictionary Act, 1 U.S.C. § 1 (2018)).
95Id. at 717.
96 See infra Part II.
97 See Hobby Lobby, 573 U.S. at 717 18 (discussing attribution for public corporations, then
sincerity compared to institutionalized persons, then attribution for corporations with dissenting
shareholders); see also infra Part II.A (analyzing the Court's attribution discussion).
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majority in Hobby Lobby rejected the notion that it would be difficult to de-
termine the sincerity of for-profit corporations.98 The opinion predicted that
claims of corporate religion will be "less difficult" to adjudicate than the sin-
cerity of religious claims by prisoners, who have a "well documented" propen-
sity to "assert claims of dubious sincerity."99 With prisoner claims, as with any
individual's accommodation claim, the sincerity inquiry can be framed as a
determination of whether an individual truly believes their claimed beliefs or is
merely pretending to hold a belief to gain some benefit from the exemption. 00
Prisoners may have more incentive than most to lie about their religious sin-
cerity to game a regimented system. 101 The Court is correct that federal courts
have a long pedigree in determining this type of sincerity. 102 Given the poten-
tial for profit by escaping a regulatory burden, religious claims by for-profit
corporations could raise a similar incentive to fabricate claims.0 3 The Court is
almost certainly correct that the federal courts can address the potential for
shareholders falsely asserting religious beliefs on the same terms as other ex-
emption cases.
Despite claiming simplicity, the Court in Hobby Lobby did recognize that
corporate sincerity, even with religiously homogenous shareholders, is slightly
more complicated than claims by individuals. The Court points to actions by
the corporations that could arguably demonstrate the corporation s sincerity. In
shoring up the religious bona fides of the Greens, the Court notes that Hobby
Lobby and Mardel close their stores on Sundays, at the expense of "millions in
sales annually," "refuse to engage in profitable transactions that facilitate or
promote alcohol use," "contribute profits to Christian missionaries and minis-
tries," and take out religious advertisements. 104 Taking actions that are opposed
98 573 U.S. at 717 19.
99 Id. at 718 (noting that Congress demonstrated faith in the federal courts' ability "to weed out
insincere claims" by prisoners when it included "institutionalized persons" as a protected category in
RLUIPA).
"' See Chapman, supra note 8, at 1201 02 (noting that the sincerity inquiry is appropriately fo-
cused on whether the "claimant 'truly' believes" their asserted beliefs); supra Part L.A (discussing
traditional test for religious sincerity); Adams & Barmore, supra note 8, at 60 (noting the incentive
accommodations create to "feign religious sincerity").
101 See Adams & Barmore, supra note 8, at 61 ("In the prison environment, both sincere and
insincere religious accommodation claims are common as intense regulation of mundane details of
daily life gives rise to frequent conflict between government and religious interests.").
102 See id. at 61-62 (detailing adjudication of religious accommodation claims by prisoners).
103 See Carlson, supra note 8, at 181 ("When there is a reason to believe there is an ulterior mo-
tive for an assertion of religious belief, there is reason to be skeptical."); see also Sepper, supra note
22, at 957 (noting that the financial benefits of being deemed a religious entity under The Employee
Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA) could lead to contracting to attain said benefits).
104 Hobby Lobby, 573 U.S. at 703. In his concurrence inMasterpiece Cakeshop, Justice Thomas
takes note of similar profit-sacrificing activities by Masterpiece Cakeshop. 138 S. Ct. at 1745 (Thom-
as, J., concurring) (noting that "Phillips routinely sacrifices profits" in furtherance of his faithby clos-
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to the profit motive of the corporation help demonstrate the religious sincerity
of the corporation by ruling out the most likely alternative motivation behind
the corporation's expression of religion-profit. Although the Court notes no
similar profit-damaging corporate activities by Conestoga, it does refer to a
"board-adopted 'Statement on the Sanctity of Human Life"' as evidence of the
corporation engaging in religious activity. 1
05
Using corporate action to demonstrate religious sincerity for a corpora-
tion, even action that may arguably harm the corporation's bottom line, is
problematic, including for corporations with homogeneous hareholders. None
of the actions noted by the Court require any person involved in the corpora-
tion to hold sincere religious beliefs. 106 These corporate acts could be required
by contractual remnants from a former religious insider that corporate actors
are bound to continue. 
107
In addition, the actions the Court noted could be taken by a cynical busi-
ness seeking to cash in on religious customers-a form of religious "green-
washing."0 8 Determining whether a particular corporate action will help or
hurt the bottom line is notoriously difficult. For example, the lost profits from
ing on Sundays, paying above averages wages, and not baking cakes "containing alcohol, cakes with
racist or homophobic messages, cakes criticizing God, and cakes celebrating Halloween"). Although
Justice Thomas uses these activities as "evidence that Phillips' conduct is expressive," he marshals
them in response to the argument hat Masterpiece's for-profit status negates the exercise of Phillips'




5 Hobby Lobby, 573 U.S. at 700 (quoting Conestoga Wood Specialties Corp. v. Sec'y of U. S.
Dep't of Health & Human Servs., 724 F.3d 377, 382 n.5 (3d Cir. 2013)). This suggests that although
corporate actions that disavow a profit motive may help demonstrate sincerity, they are not necessary.
106 Management of the corporation has great latitude to make virtually any business decision that
complies with the law, regardless of motive. See Hardee, supra note 77, at 235 (describing how corpo-
rate law allows management of corporations to take actions that exceed regulatory standards); Jason
Iuliano, Do Corporations Have Religious Beliefs?, 90 IND. L.J. 47, 83 (2015) ("Indeed, corporations
can even possess states that none of their members hold."); infra Part II.B. 1.
107 For example, a provision requiring all corporate stores to be closed on Sunday could be placed
in the corporation's articles of incorporation and corporate management would be required to follow
such dictates, even if the religious insider responsible for the provision had since left the corporation.
See luliano, supra note 106, at 90 91 (demonstrating how a corporation can "adopt religious beliefs
independent of the beliefs of their members" and, thus, is capable of having religious beliefs of its
own). Such a provision is not merely theoretical. Mergers and other business combinations between
secular and Catholic hospitals have led to "zombie" religious institutions where provisions in the
merger documents require hospitals to maintain their "religious identity and/or restrictions" on treat-
ment even after "they further no charitable mission, grant no role to religious orders, and have no
Catholic ownership." Sepper, supra note 22, at 940. These agreements can require "an eternity of
compliance." Id. at 941.
108 The purchasing power of the Christian market is around $5.1 trillion a year. See Liza Porteus
Viana, Faith-Based Marketing Can Tap into Powerful Consumer Base, FOX BUS. (Sept. 28, 2011),
https://www .foxbusiness.com/features/faith-based-marketing-can-tap-into-powerful-consumer-base
[https://perma.cc/EM92-63R8] (discussing ways that corporations market themselves to Christian
customers).
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closing the store on Sunday may be more than made up for by religious cus-
tomers who choose the store over its competitors because of its religious
stance. 109
The Court's discussion is better read as proof of the shareholders ' incere
belief that they must run their corporation according to their religious beliefs
than as evidence of the corporation 's religion. "10 Religious sincerity for ex-
emptions claimed by a corporation, thus, require a claim that shareholders have
both a sincere religious belief that an action the law requires of the corporation is
sinful and a sincere religious belief that it is sinful to own and operate a corpora-
tion engaged in that sinful activity. 111 These two prongs explain why the Court
looks to both the individual shareholders' sincerity and the corporation's practic-
es-as the Court notes, the Hahns and the Greens meet both requirements. 112
For religiously homogenous corporations, requiring a belief that it is sin-
ful to own a corporation engaging in sinful behavior should be limited to situa-
tions where the religious shareholders exercise ownership and control over the
corporation. 113 If an exemption were to require a belief that merely profiting
from ownership in a corporation that engages in sinful behavior violates the
claimants' religious beliefs, then whether the claimants own stock in other cor-
porations that engage in that behavior could provide evidence that they are act-
ing "inconsistently with their alleged religious beliefs." 114 This type of "narra-
tive fit evidence" was not at issue in Hobby Lobby, although the Hahns and the
Greens almost certainly have assets in the public stock market, which would
109 The difficulty in determining whether corporate decisions were calculated to lead to increased
profits led to the creation of the business judgment rule, which protects management from sharehold-
ers second guessing board decisions that lead to corporate losses. See Mocsary, supra note 4, at 1333
(describing the operation of the business judgment rule in the context of closely held corporations).
1 o See Chapman, supra note 8, at 1235 36 (noting that courts will look at the "narrative fit" be-
tween the claimed belief and the "claimant's religious biography").
111 These two prongs are conceptually distinct. A corporate owner may believe that their personal
use of contraception is sinful but not believe that providing health insurance to their employees that
covers contraception implicates them personally. They may also hold the religious belief that they are
required to separate their religion from the commands of the secular government as much as possible.
See, e.g.,Matthew 22:21 (King James) ("Render therefore unto Caesar the things which are Caesar's;
and unto God the things that are God's.").
112 See Hobby Lobby, 573 U.S. at 701 ("The Hahns believe that they are required to run their
business in accordance with their religious beliefs and moral principles.") (internal quotations omit-
ted); id. at 703 ("Each [of the Greens] has signed a pledge to runthe businesses in accordance withthe
family's religious beliefs ....").
113 For heterogeneous corporations, a shareholder with a minority position in a corporation claim-
ing an exemption could make passive ownership in other corporations relevant to the "narrative fit" of
the claimed exemption. See infra note 250 and accompanying text.
114 Chapman, supra note 8, at 1234 37 (describing "narrative fit evidence"). Although not out-
come determinative, this evidence can be used in determining sincerity. Id.
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mean they were likely profiting from companies that provide the contraceptive
coverage they refused to fund. 5
Once the sincerity inquiry is properly focused on the shareholders of the
corporation, the veracity of the shareholders' beliefs fits comfortably within
the traditional sincerity analysis for individuals. The Court may focus on the
truthfulness of the shareholders' beliefs, rather than their accuracy, with only
the slight wrinkle that such beliefs must also include a claim that their religion
requires them to run their business in accordance with their religious beliefs.
This shareholder focused sincerity inquiry, however, fractures when confront-
ing a corporation with shareholders who do not share the same sincere reli-
gious beliefs.
II. AN ATTRIBUTION INQUIRY Is NECESSARY TO DETERMINE
CORPORATE RELIGIOUS SINCERITY
Although the corporate religious exemption cases have only involved
corporations with religiously homogenous shareholders thus far, the Court left
open the door to religious exemption claims by corporations with religiously
heterogeneous shareholders. Because they involve shareholders with profit
motives and shareholders with religious motives, these heterogeneous hare-
holder corporations raise an additional axis on which to adjudicate religious
sincerity: whose beliefs should be attributed to the corporation for purposes of
determining the sincerity of the corporate entity requesting the exemption?
Although it may be tempting to adopt the least complicated answer-use the
motivation of whomever controls the decision regarding corporate religion for
the corporation-that solution is highly problematic. The laws governing cor-
porate control have no sincerity requirement so equating attribution and con-
trol would allow parties to monetize religious sincerity in a way that is harmful
to third parties and diminishes the value of religious liberty.
A. Exemptions for Religiously Heterogeneous Corporations
The similarities between the corporate shareholders in Burwell v. Hobby
Lobby Stores, Inc. have prompted some scholars to hypothesize that both unan-
imous religious sincerity among owners and exclusive corporate control may
be prerequisites for claiming a corporate religion exemption. "16 The Court's
115 The fact of their concurrent ownership would be relevant o "fit," even though the fact that
Hobby Lobby voluntarily provided coverage for the same contraceptives under previous health plans
was not. See id. at 1234 35 (cautioning that changes inbelief overtime or mistakes should not lead to
a finding of insincerity).
116 See Taub, supra note 90, at 419 20 (arguing that all shareholders haring the same religious
beliefs is a potential prerequisite for claiming a corporate exemption under RFRA).
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limited discussion of Jack Phillip's ownership and control over the corporation
in Masterpiece Cakeshop, Ltd. v. Colorado Civil Rights Commission is con-
sistent with that reasoning. 7 Although that position is arguable, and may in
fact be the ideal normative outcome, the Court's failure to detail the other
shareholders involved in the corporations and its dicta regarding dissenting
shareholders and public corporations makes it likely that religious exemptions
may be available to at least some corporations that do not fit the unanimous
shareholder sincerity model. 8
The Court's corporate religion opinions, either intentionally or inadvert-
ently, paper over complexities regarding the ownership of the corporations at
issue. Jack Phillips is not the sole owner of Masterpiece Cakeshop. His wife is
also an owner, although she is never mentioned in the opinion. 119 Likewise,
although the Green family operates Hobby Lobby through a management rust
that holds all of the company's voting shares, there are also nonvoting shares
in the corporation that are "divided into various interests held by the individual
members of the Green family." 120 Perhaps the Court ignored these complica-
tions in its written opinion because it was confident that the religious sincerity
of all owners of the corporations was accounted for, but it is possible that the
Court used a definition of "own and operate" that does not require unanimity
of ownership and control.
Even without reading into the background of the corporations at issue, the
Court's dicta in Hobby Lobby suggests that homogenous religious shareholder
sincerity is not required. In response to concerns that dissenting minority
shareholders might be forced to participate in the majority's religious exercise,
the Court notes that state law regarding intra-corporate disputes "provides a
11' The Court repeatedly stresses that Phillips "owns" the bakery. See, e.g., Masterpiece Cakeshop,
Ltd. v. Colo. Civil Rights Comm'n, 138 S. Ct. 1719, 1723 (2018) ("the shop's owner"); id. at 1723 24
("The Court's precedents make clear that the baker, in his capacity as the owner of a business serving
the public...."). In fact, Masterpiece Cakeshop has an additional owner, Debra Phillips, Jack's wife.
See infra note 150 and accompanying text.
118 See infra notes 240 245 and accompanying text (arguing the Court should require unanimous
shareholder agreement to claim an exemption); infra notes 276 278 and accompanying text (arguing
the best rule is de minimis shareholder ownership and control by non-religious shareholders).
119 Brief for Petitioners, supra note 68, at ii. Phillips' brief to the Court does not mentionwhether
Debra Phillips shares the same religious beliefs as her husband. This lack of attention to the other
shareholder of Masterpiece Cakeshop might also suggest hat there are different rules for religious
exemptions that rely on a shareholder as an employee being personally forced to engage in allegedly
expressive activity. See infra notes 147 151 and accompanying text.
120 James Lesinski, Caringfor the Body and the Soul: Small Businesses Post-Hobby Lobby and
HHS Contraceptive Rule, 27 HEALTH MATRIX 495, 514 (2017) (describing the ownership structure of
Hobby Lobby). Because it is a private corporation, there are no public disclosures regarding share-
holders. What information is available was gleaned from what the corporation's General Counsel
chose to share during an interview. See id. at 514 n. 127 (citing an interview with Peter Dobelbower,
General Counsel of Hobby Lobby Stores).
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ready means for resolving" such conflicts.121 This response suggests that a
shareholder who does not share the sincerely religious views of the majority
does not necessarily defeat the corporation's religious sincerity, allowing for
exemptions by religiously heterogeneous corporations. 
22
Of note, the Hobby Lobby opinion says nothing about corporations with
assenting agnostic shareholders, but it is logical to extend the Court's reason-
ing to them. 123 Corporations with dissenting shareholders and assenting agnos-
tic shareholders are both comprised of some shareholders who do not hold the
same religious beliefs as those claiming the exemption. If a shareholder who
objects to the controlling shareholders' religious exercise through the corpora-
tion does not defeat the corporation's claim for an exemption, it seems logical
that a shareholder who does not share, but is willing to go along with, the con-
trolling shareholder's religious exercise would likewise not necessarily defeat
an exemption. A contrary result would embrace the normatively problematic
stance that a lack of unanimity is only acceptable if the controlling sharehold-
er's religious beliefs are being forced upon a minority shareholder. 1
24
Exemptions for corporations with heterogeneous hareholders combined
with the Court's dicta regarding public corporations broaden the inquiry even
further. The Court refused to rule out the possibility that public corporations
may claim religious exemptions, merely noting that sufficient shareholder
agreement is unlikely to happen as a practical matter. 125 If unanimity of share-
holder belief is not required, however, it is not at all clear that a number of
121 Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 573 U.S. 682, 718 19 (2014). State corporate law, in
fact, does not have such a mechanism that aligns well with forced religious practice claims by minori-
ty shareholders. See infra notes 207 239 and accompanying text.
122 See Carlson, supra note 8, at 196 (remarking that the courts will eventually face "intra-
corporate disputes" regarding exemptions).
123 See Adams & Barmore, supra note 8, at 65 66 (noting that courts will eventually need to face
questions about religious sincerity in "nonuniform corporations"). The Department of Health and
Human Services (HHS) has passed regulations underboth President Obama and President Trump that
provide for exemptions without unanimous shareholder sincerity. See Religious Exemptions and Ac-
commodations for Coverage of Certain Preventive Services Under the Affordable Care Act, 83 Fed.
Reg. 57,536 (Nov. 15, 2018) (to be codified at 26 C.F.R. pt. 54; 29 C.F.R. pt. 2590; 45 C.F.R. pt. 147)
(Trump final rule); Coverage of Certain Preventative Services Under the Affordable Care Act, 45
C.F.R. § 147 (2015) (Obama final rule).
124 This rule would paradoxically allow a dissenting shareholder to curb the use of the corporation
for religious purposes simply by supporting the majority's religious exercise even though still not
sharing the majority's religious faith.
125 Hobby Lobby, 573 U.S. at 718 (stating "numerous practical restraints would likely prevent"
assertions of RFRA claims by public corporations). The Court's language in this section again sug-
gests unanimity is not required. The Court merely states that it is unlikely that "unrelated shareholders
... would agree to run a corporation under the same religious beliefs." Id. at 717. Public corporations
"agree" to take actions by electing directors who then choose to take those actions and only a plurality
shareholder vote is necessary to elect directors. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 216(3) (2020) ("Di-
rectors shall be elected by a plurality of the votes .... ").
1786 [Vol. 61:1763
The Paradox of Religious Sincerity
public corporations would be unable to gather the required shareholder assent.
Many public companies have controlling shareholders or shareholder fami-
lies. 126 In addition, the increasing popularity of dual class structures allows for
small numbers of shareholders, sometimes individuals, to control the voting
power of large public corporations. 127 In sum, it appears that although unani-
mous shareholder sincerity is sufficient to find corporate sincerity, it is not
necessary.
Corporations with heterogeneous religious beliefs among their sharehold-
ers add a layer of complexity to the question of corporate sincerity. Unlike hu-
man beings, who have a singular identity, corporations are comprised of any
number of people, all with their own values and motivations for corporate
ownership. 128 One group of shareholders may sincerely believe in a religious
practice whereas another group makes no claim that they share such beliefs.
Heterogeneous hareholder religion, thus, creates the potential for asymmetry
between the sincerity of some shareholders and the religious claims of the cor-
poration. In addition to individual motivations, each corporation has its own
unique structure that defines who within the corporation has what powers and
benefits. 129 Thus, sincerity for a corporation is not a singular inquiry regarding
the veracity of shareholders' beliefs but, rather, requires an analysis of all the
126 See Lucian A. Bebchuk & Assaf Hamdani, Independent Directors and Controlling Sharehold-
ers, 165 U. PA. L. REv. 1271, 1279 (2017) (noting that 220 public companies on the Russell 3000
Index have one shareholder with more than fifty percent ownership).
127 "One-fifth of companies that listed on U. S. stock exchanges last year had dual-class shares."
Vijay Govindarajan et al., ShouldDual-Class Shares Be Banned?, HARV. BUS. REV. (Dec. 3, 2018),
https://hbr.org/2018/12/should-dual-class-shares-be-banned [https://perna.cc/MHH5-LDEC]. They
are particularly popular with family-controlled firms and large tech companies, including tech giants
like Facebook and Alphabet. Id.; see also Bebchuk & Hamdani, supra note 126, at 1279 (noting that
"a sizeable minority of large, publicly traded firms" has controlling shareholders).
128 A singular identity does not necessarily mean a singular focus. Individuals may be motivated
to engage in one action for multiple reasons, some religious, some secular. These mixed motives do
not defeat religious sincerity so long as the act is at least in part motivated by religious sincerity. See
Chapman, supra note 8, at 1233 (arguing that only one sufficient motivation is necessary to meet the
religious sincerity requirement, even if other non-sincere motivations exist). Corporate religious sin-
cerity differs because the base unit by which sincerity is judged is the individual. See supra Part I.B. 1.
In religiously heterogeneous corporations, the corporation has mixed motives but each individual
does not-some are sincere and some are unquestionably not sincere. See generally Mocsary, supra
note 4 (advocating for the law to permit formalizing multiple corporate purposes due to the aforemen-
tioned variety of reasons for corporate ownership).
129 See Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 23, at 1417 ("The corporate code in almost every state
is an 'enabling' statute. An enabling statute allows managers and investors to write their own tickets,
to establish systems of governance without substantive scrutiny from a regulator and without effective
restraint on the permissible methods of corporate governance."); Bernard S. Sharfman, A Private
Ordering Defense of a Company's Right to Use Dual Class Share Structures in IPOs, 63 VILL. L.
REV. 1, 21 22 (2018) (describing how private ordering allows each corporation to tailor itself to suit
the unique needs of participants).
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individuals who may be working together for various purposes and their vary-
ing levels of ownership and control.
To take a simple example, consider a corporation with two shareholders:
Shareholder A holds sincere religious beliefs that life begins at conception, that
certain contraception mandated under the ACA are abortifacients, and that it
would be sinful for him to provide health insurance to his employees that co-
vers such contraception.130 Shareholder B affirmatively states she does not
share these beliefs. Sincerity is not a question of ferreting out whether A and B
are honest about their religious beliefs. Rather, it is a question of determining
whose religious beliefs should be attributed to the single entity that is claiming
the exemption (the corporation). 131
The myriad possibilities for corporate control and structure complicate
the question exponentially. Attribution may differ ifA owns 90% of the corpo-
ration's common stock or if A owns only 10%. Beyond share ownership per-
centages, A and B may have entered into any number of agreements that divvy
up control over the corporation. A may own nonvoting shares or a class of
shares that elects the majority of directors. A and B may have entered into a
contract giving A the right to determine the religious practices of the corpora-
tion writ large or a narrower contract that gives A the right to make decisions
relating to employee contraceptive coverage. In addition, B might oppose the
exemption or assent o it. As the number of shareholders increases, the poten-
tial for complexity grows. Given the virtually unlimited ways a corporation
can be constituted, the question of which combinations of ownership, control,
and contractual rights allow for religious shareholders to claim exemptions and
which do not is a practical quagmire.
Assenting agnostic shareholders who agree to allow religious sharehold-
ers to use the corporation for religious ends do so in exchange for some finan-
cial or control benefit. 132 When negotiating the myriad aspects of the corpora-
tion, the right to use the corporation for religious ends could become another
"stick" in the bundle of corporate rights that can be monetized in the negotia-
tions between shareholders in determining their relationship to one another and
130 These are the beliefs held by petitioners in Hobby Lobby. 573 U.S. at 701.
131 This question could be reframed as determining whose burden is considered for demonstrating
a burden on religious practice. In this example, there is a burden on A's religious beliefs, but B suffers
no burden.
112 Benefits may include additional share ownership, reduced capital commitments, and control
rights over other aspects of the corporation. The right to claim religious exemptions on behalf of the
corporation could also serve to entice a reluctant investor to decide to invest in the corporation. See
infra Part II.B. 1.
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the corporation. '33 The religious shareholder can gain concessions from the
agnostic shareholder regarding the religious practices of the corporations in
exchange for providing some financial or control benefit to the agnostic share-
holder. 134 This relatively mundane reality of corporate practice becomes prob-
lematic in a religious setting because of the profit motive driving the agnostic
shareholder. It is clear from religious sincerity doctrine that a pure profit mo-
tive defeats claims of religious sincerity.3 5 Profit motives are de jure in corpo-
rate law, however, making it unclear whether corporate religious exemptions
are justified when some shareholders have sincerely religious motives and oth-
ers have a profit motive.
The Court's note that corporations may claim exemptions despite dissent-
ing shareholders, if state corporate law permits it, suggests that some mixed
motives among shareholders may be allowed. 136 If it is possible to claim an
exemption with a dissenting shareholder, then unanimous shareholder sincerity
cannot be required to find corporate sincerity. A shareholder dissenting to cor-
porate religious practices ex post-after their investment is already locked into
the corporation-may have the ability under state law to block religious prac-
tices that harm corporate profits. 137 If they lack that ability, however, the Court
seems to suggest hat the religious controlling shareholder may request a reli-
gious exemption over their dissent. Unlike an assenting shareholder, a dissenting
shareholder does not introduce a profit motive into the corporation because they
have not negotiated with the religious shareholder to allow the exemption. Alt-
hough this scenario may be less troubling in relation to profit motives, it raises a
host of issues regarding the religious rights of the minority shareholder. 1
38
The Court in Hobby Lobby ignores the complexity raised by attribution
and instead questions why it would be more difficult to determine the sincerity
of for-profit corporations than the sincerity of nonprofit corporations. 139 The
answer is that nonprofit corporations do not suffer from the problem of profit
motivation. Nonprofits do not exist to make a profit, in fact, they are prohibit-
ed from distributing corporate assets, and in most states they do not even have
133 See Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 23, at 1430 (describing how corporate governance
terms are "fully priced in transactions among the interested parties"); Mocsary, supra note 4, at 1337
3 8 (describing the bundle of sticks of corporate ownership, including ownership and control rights).
134 See Sharfman, supra note 129, at2l 22 (describing private ordering as a"bargaining process"
for corporate governance arrangements).135 See Hobby Lobby, 573 U.S. at 717 n.28 ("[A] corporation's pretextual assertion of a religious
belief in order to obtain an exemption for financial reasons would fail."); see also Chapman, supra
note 8, at 1231 32 (noting that "financial windfalls" can be "powerful evidence of insincerity").
136 HobbyLobby, 573 U.S. at718 19.
137 See infra Part III.A.1.
138 See infra Part II.A. 1.
139 573 U.S. at 718 (noting that the government conceded that RFRA would apply to nonprofits).
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shareholders. 140 Rather, nonprofits exist to further a social mission with every-
one involved in the nonprofit corporation, at the very least, sharing a belief in
that social mission. 141 Although members of a nonprofit, such as congregants
of a church, might disagree over particular practices the organization wishes to
engage in, the organization itself is the entity the courts evaluate, not its con-
stituent members. 142 Courts already make such determinations under Title VII,
which allows "religious corporations" to discriminate on the basis of reli-
gion. 143 These determinations are made based on whether the corporation itself
can legitimately be considered "religious" based on its "purpose, function, ac-tiviy, nd elf-xprssin tothe. ,144
tivity, and self-expression to the community. The entity is deemed reli-
gious, making any disagreements regarding religious practices among mem-
bers irrelevant.145 Corporate religious sincerity under RFRA, on the other
hand, is not focused on the corporation itself, but, rather, it looks through the
corporation to the individuals involved, making the disparity between share-
holders' religious beliefs a key consideration. 146
Religious exemptions for the expressive religious actions of a shareholder
acting in their role as an employee add another potential wrinkle to the corpo-
rate attribution question. In many closely held corporations, shareholders do
not just own and control the corporation-they also work as employees. 147 In
Hobby Lobby, the shareholders were not required to demonstrate that they
were personally involved in the distribution of the objected-to contraceptives
or the administration of the company insurance plan; the corporation itself pay-
140 See Macey & Strine, supra note 88, at 521 22 (describing structural differences between non-
profit and for-profit corporations).
141 See id. at 523. They may have other motivations forbeing involved in the nonprofit, but indi-
viduals with multiple internal motivations do not defeat sincerity. See Chapman, supra note 8, at 1233
(arguing that only one sufficient motivation is necessary to meet the religious sincerity requirement,
even if other non-sincere motivations exist).
142 See Carlson, supra note 8, at 184 85 (describing how courts determine whether a corporation
is a religious organization for purposes of Title VII, Section 702 of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (Title
VII)).
143 Id. This legitimacy test has "easily rejected" for-profit companies as religious organizations,
despite the religious sincerity of the individual owners, because the corporation is primarily secular in
nature. Id. at 185 86.
144 Id. at 185. Nonprofits that perform both secular and religious services are not always found to
be "religious" under this test because of an entity's mixed mission, but the "sincerity of the religious
beliefs of [their] individuals[,] founders[,] and managers" is still irrelevant. Id. at 186.
145 See id. at 185 86.
146 Professor Carlson considers whether the sincerity of for-profit corporations under RFRA
should be judged by the individual sincerity test orthe entity legitimacy test and concludes that given
Hobby Lobby's focus on the religious beliefs of the individuals, it must be the former. Id. at 194 96;
see also supra notes 70 94.
147 See Mocsary, supra note 4, at 1328 29 (noting that in the early stages of the corporation, the
founders likely work within the firm).
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ing for insurance was sufficient to justify an exemption for all shareholders. 148
The Court in Masterpiece Cakeshop, however, spent significant ime focused on
Jack Phillips' acts as an employee baking the cake instead of any acts as an own-
er. 149 A claim that is both religious and expressive may then be based on a com-
bination of share ownership, control, and employment, which further compli-
cates the attribution analysis. A corporation could conceivably demonstrate that
the corporation writ large is sincere because there is a sufficient presence of
religious shareholders, but there may be an additional requirement that the
shareholder-employee engaged in the expressive act is one of the religious
shareholders. 1
50
B. Corporate Control Is Not the Appropriate Attribution Inquiry
One solution to the attribution inquiry is to look to "whomever the law
assigns authority to determine the institution's religious 'beliefs,"' and if the
individuals who have the power to control corporate action are religiously sin-
cere, "a court should conclude that the institution [is] too." 151 This understand-
ing finds support in Hobby Lobby, where the Court asked state corporate law
with determining whether a corporation with dissenting shareholders can claim
an exemption. 152 By drawing a parallel to a corporate decision to close their
stores on the Sabbath, Hobby Lobby could be read as indicating that state law
regarding corporate control will determine which shareholder's sincerity is
relevant for attribution. 153 In other words, whoever has the power to make the
decision regarding the religious practice is the individual who must hold the
sincere religious beliefs.
Although a control test is tempting in its ease of application, the majority
in Hobby Lobby was not consistent in its consideration of corporate control.
The majority notes that public corporations are unlikely to claim exemptions
148 See 573 U.S. at 724 (noting the petitioner's belief that the corporation providing the insurance
was sinful).
149 The focus in the opinion was on the creation of the cake and the expressive nature of that act.
See, e.g., 138 S. Ct. at 1724 ("To Phillips, creating a wedding cake for a same-sex wedding would be
equivalent to participating in a celebration that is contrary to his own most deeply held beliefs."); id.
(quoting Phillips that "'to create a wedding cake ... would have been a personal endorsement'"). This
focus is understandable given the nature of Phillips' two claims: a Free Exercise and Free Speech
claim. Id. at 1726. Although the majority only addressed the Free Exercise question, the speech ele-
ments of the claim cannot be ignored.
150 The fact that Debra Phillips is never mentioned in the opinion, despite being a co-owner of the
corporate party, suggests that the claim relates to Mr. Phillips' rights alone, perhaps due to his role as
the employee at issue. See supra note 68 and accompanying text.
151 Chapman, supra note 8, at 1240.
152 573 U.S. at 718 19.
153 See id. at 718.
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because their shareholders are unlikely to agree to do so.154 Shareholders,
however, are not the individuals who have the power to determine corporate
action in public companies-the board of directors makes such decisions. 1
55
The Court recognized this in Citizens United v. Federal Election Commission,
where it tapped "the procedures of corporate democracy," rather than the
shareholders, with determining who speaks for corporations, including public
corporations.56
This disconnect arises because the Court's holding in Hobby Lobby boils
down to a determination that it is appropriate in some circumstances to ignore
the corporate entity and to look at the religious liberty of the shareholders di-
rectly. 157 It is difficult to use corporate law to make consistent determinations
regarding which corporations qualify for exemptions when those rules depend
on an entity that the Court disregarded. 158 A mismatch results because both
Hobby Lobby and Masterpiece Cakeshop make it clear that shareholders, ra-
ther than the corporation itself, have the ight to religious freedom, but in cor-
porate law, shareholders do not always equate to control and control does not
equate to sincerity.
154 Id. at 717.
155 See Sharfman, supra note 129, at 23 24 (calling "the rle that provides the board with ulti-
mate decision-making authority," "the most important default rule under corporate law"). Arguably,
shareholders control the board with the power to remove directors with whom they disagree, but in
reality, the shareholder franchise in public corporations is notoriously weak. See Margaret M. Blair&
Lynn A. Stout, A Team Production Theory of Corporate Law, 85 VA. L. REV. 247, 310 (1999) ("In
both theory and practice... shareholders' voting rights at least inpublicly-traded corporations are
so weak as to be virtually meaningless."); Leo E. Strine, Jr., Corporate Power Ratchet: The Courts'
Role in Eroding "We the People's" Ability to Constrain Our Corporate Creations, 51 HARV. C.R.-
C.L. L. REv. 423, 443-44 (2016) (noting the institutionalization of stock ownership and the minimal
influence most stockholders have in the voting process).
156 558 U.S. 310, 361 62 (2010) (quoting First Nat'l Bank of Bos. v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 794
(1978)); see Hardee, supra note 75, at 772 73 (distinguishing the Court's differing treatment of cor-
porate control in Citizens United and Hobby Lobby).
151 See 573 U.S. at 707 ("[P]rotecting the free-exercise rights of corporations like Hobby Lobby,
Conestoga, and Mardel protects the religious liberty of the humans who own and control those com-
panies."); see also Hardee, supra note 77, at 250 51 (noting the rejection of a separate corporate enti-
ty); Mark, supra note 77, at 541 ("Note that to assert he rights of its owners' equity, the collective
acts of the entity are beside the point; entities exist solely as vehicles to 'provide protection for human
beings."').
158 These distinctions are not made in Citizens United, where the Court granted speech rights to
all corporations. See supra note 88 and accompanying text. Speech rights were granted to the corpora-
tion itself, with the power to determine corporate speech clearly placed in the hands of whomever
controls the corporation. See Hardee, supra note 75, at 768. Perhaps the Court felt more comfortable
granting speech rights to those who control the corporationbecause the right to speak does not require
any personal sincerity.
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1. Corporate Law Is Not Designed to Measure Sincerity
Using corporate control to substitute for attribution is attractive because it
prevents allegations that the law is hostile to religion by using "religiously-
neutral principles of law that govern the analysis of a corporation's mental
state in other contexts." 159 But corporate law does not analyze the corpora-
tion's mental state in other contexts. The focus of corporate law is on the con-
tractual rights of parties, not their motivations. 160 Numerous scholars have
documented the poor fit between corporate religious rights and corporate
law. 161
Corporate law is designed to facilitate contracting between private parties,
not to adjudicate the public law rights of shareholders. 162 In general, share-
holders and management are allowed to contract between themselves for what-
ever set of financial and control benefits they desire. 163 Corporate law's prefer-
ence for private ordering is strongest when dealing with nonpublic, or closely
held, corporations.164 Shareholders of nonpublic companies may, either
through the board of directors or between themselves, contract for nearly any
corporate structure they choose. This includes dissolving the board of directors
to manage the corporation directly and delegating corporate decision-making
authority to corporate outsiders. 165 To the extent that private ordering harms
those not party to corporate contracting, the law relies on external regulation to
police the negative externalities of the corporate form. 1
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159 Chapman- supra note 8, at 1240.
160 The only motive corporate law assumes, and occasionally requires, is a profit motive. Profit
motives are required when minority shareholders' financial interests are harmed by the majority's
other motivations. See infra Part III.A. 1. At other times, profit is assumed as the default because it is
the only motive all shareholders have in common. See Daniel J.H. Greenwood, Essential Speech: Why
Corporate Speech Is NotFree, 83 IOWAL. REv. 995, 1049 (1998) ("While real people must balance
competing values .... corporations ... just maximize shareholder value."); Strine & Walter, supra
note 4, at 347.
161 See generally Buccola, supra note 7; Pollman, supra note 7; Strine, supra note 7.
162 See Pollman, supra note 7, at 657 (noting that corporate law is not designed to answer consti-
tutional questions).
163 See Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 23, at 1418 (noting that "corporate law enables the
participants to select the optimal arrangement for the many different sets of risks and opportunities
that are available in a large economy").
164 See Mocsary, supra note 4, at 1330 (noting that shareholder power "is at its apex" in firms
with simple structures because the shareholders have complete ownership and control overthe corpo-
ration).
165 See, e.g., MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT § 7.32 (AM. BAR ASS'N 2016) (permitting shareholder
agreements that allow for changes to otherwise mandatory corporate law rules, such as running the
corporation through the board of directors).
166 This was not always the case. Private ordering did not always exist to the extent allowed to-
day. Historically, the dangers of negative externalities from the corporate form were controlled by
corporate law through, among other means, limited corporate purposes and the ultra vires doctrine.
See Pollman- supra note 7, at 647 50 (detailing the history of corporate law).
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The primary driver of corporate law is economic efficiency. 167 Parties are
given great freedom to contract because it is believed that, in doing so, they
will create corporate structures that maximize the value of the enterprise.68 In
determining value, one underlying presumption is that everyone involved in
the corporation is motivated, at least in part, by a desire for profit. 169 Corporate
law largely ignores other motivations, not because shareholders do not have
them-for example, family legacy, continued employment, environmental pro-
tection, etc.-but because such goals are not necessarily common to all share-
holders. 170 To the extent that some shareholders hold idiosyncratic values apart
from profit, the law allows corporate participants to monetize those values
through contracting to create the greatest overall value for all parties to the
corporation. 171 When disputes arise, the law does not parse out motives but,
instead, seeks to enforce the parties' agreements. In doing so, it is believed that
the value of the enterprise to all participants will be maximized.
2. A Control Test Would Allow Exemptions That Monetize Sincerity
The most telling evidence that corporate law is a bad measure of sincerity
is that a corporation can engage in a practice without having a single living
person in the corporation who agrees with it. 172 Such a situation is problematic
under Hobby Lobby, given the Court's focus on the sincere religious beliefs of
the shareholders. Even assuming that the Court would require at least one cur-
167 See Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 23, at 1421 (arguing that corporate law permits private
ordering to incentivize corporate actors to maximize economic efficiency). There are scholars who
criticize this aspect of corporate law, arguing that corporate law should be drivenby more communi-
tarianvalues, including a more expansive view of corporate stakeholders. See, e.g., Ackerman & Cole,
supra note 78, at 902.
168 See Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 23, at 1421 (describing how flexibility to contract for
governance structures will "find the devices most likely to maximize net profits"). Some theories of
the corporation that reject shareholder primacy still recognize that courts will "enforce explicit con-
tracts among team members allocating rights and duties" because onbalance respecting internal deci-
sion making is advantageous to the corporation and its various stakeholders. See Blair & Stout, supra
note 155, at 284 85 (describing the rationale behind the enforcement of contracting under the team
production theory of corporations).
169 See Strine, supra note 155, at 441 (noting that although humans have varying interests, share-
holders' "only common interest is in corporate profitability").
171 See id. (same).
1 See Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 23, at 1426 (noting that contractual arrangements with-
in corporations are "wonderfully diverse, matching the diversity of economic activity that is carried on
within corporations").
172 See luliano, supra note 106, at 92 (using the decision-making features of corporations to
demonstrate that a "corporation will perform an action that not a single one of the decision makers
wanted it to do"); see also Sepper, supra note 22, at 940 (describing how contracting can lead to insti-
tutions that continue their religious identity after all relationships with the original religious entity
have ceased).
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rent corporate participant to be religiously sincere, because corporate law en-
courages parties to contract for control to maximize corporate value, allowing
control to stand in for the attribution inquiry opens up avenues to monetize
religious sincerity.
For example, corporate law would not prevent a secular company looking
to take advantage of the financial benefits of a religious exemption from sell-
ing a corporate share with control over the religious practice in question to a
sincerely religious shareholder. Various contractual arrangements could give
that religious shareholder very little ownership interest, except for the sole
power to control the corporation's religious practices. This power could control
the corporation's religious practices as a whole or only the religious practice
relating to the claimed exemption. 173 Given that the religious exemptions
claimed to date do not appear to result in a financial windfall for the corpora-
tion, this type of scenario may not be of great concern. 1
74
A far more likely scenario is a religious investor who wishes to prevent as
many people as possible from engaging in practices he believes to be sinful.
He may do so by investing in companies in exchange for the right to control
the "religious practices" of the company, including claiming religious exemp-
tions. Certain religious groups do not hide their intention to use religious ex-
emptions to prevent what they see as sinful behavior that the law may no long-
er prohibit outright. 175 These groups encourage parishioners to run their busi-
nesses in accordance with their faith, including seeking religious exemptions
that compel those dependent on the company, such as employees, to follow the
religious practices of their employers. 176 In doing so, religious individuals are
able to preserve traditional morals by utilizing religious accommodations for
complicity-based exemptions, which attempt to enforce cultural norms by lev-
eraging financial control-such as the provision of employer-supplied health
insurance-to disincentivize "sinful" behavior in others. 1
77
173 For example, the religious shareholder could be given a share that has the power to veto a
particular decision by the board of directors, which could include decisions involving contraceptive
coverage for employees. This type of "holy share" would find an analog in the "golden share" origi-
nally held by governments in privatized enterprises. See Andrei A. Baev, Is There a Niche for the
State in Corporate Governance? Securitization of State-Owned Enterprises and New Forms of State
Ownership, 18 Hous. J. INT'L L. 1, 4 (1995) (describing golden shares in the privatization context).
174 This scenario is not out of the realm of possibility, however, as there are some religious ex-
emptions that provide financial incentives. See Sepper, supra note 22, at 957 58 (discussing the fi-
nancial benefits to religious institutions who are not required to comply with costly ERISA regula-
tions).
175 See NeJaime & Siegel, supra note 22, at 2548 (discussing the mobilization of some Christian
denominations "to enforce traditional morality in the law of abortion and marriage and to seek con-
science-based exemptions from laws that depart from traditional morality").
176 See id. at 2548 50 (providing examples of such encouragement).
177 See id. at 2552 (explaining the process of preservation through transformation).
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Investors are no exception to this trend. 78 Religious shareholders could
choose to invest in corporations with assenting agnostic shareholders for pure-
ly business motives because the religious hareholders believe it is the most
profitable use of their time or capital. 179 But religious shareholders may also
consider the investment itself a religious exercise by creating more business
entities that are operated in accordance with their religious faith, including
seeking religious exemptions to prevent "sinful" behavior by others. 8  Invest-
ing to expand the number of business entities who can claim religious exemp-
tions could be considered a religious end in itself' 8'
If there is a group of people who value something-such as the power to
control a corporation's religious actions-the market for corporate control is
designed to respond with the ability to buy it. 8 2 Agnostic entrepreneurs seek-
ing to finance a new or existing business may be willing to exchange control
over a religious exemption (for example, the right to determine the contracep-
tive coverage for employees) for a secular benefit like securing capital. 18 3 Ear-
ly stage religious investors could use contracts to lock in control over a reli-
gious exemption for relatively low amounts of capital-bringing new meaning
to the term "angel investor." 18 4 As the company grows, the religious investor
178For example, Praxis provides training for entrepreneurs looking for funding with an emphasis
on "Redemptive Entrepreneurship," defined as "the work of joining God in creative restoration
through sacrifice, in venture building and innovation." Mission and Model, PRAXIS LABS, https://
www.praxislabs.org/mission-and-model [https://perma.cc/HUR5-J4DM]. Praxis advertises a network
of religious investors who work with their entrepreneurs to build businesses that further Christian
ideals. Theirwebsite declares: "The future of culture largely depends on the next generation of entre-
preneurs. And our culture needs entrepreneurs who are formed by the gospel." Id.
179 Forexample, two business acquaintances may decide to enter into ajointventure because they
value each other's business acumen, and it is merely a coincidence that one believes her religion dic-
tates running the business in line with her religious beliefs whereas the other does not.
180 This Article assumes the sincerity of the religious shareholder, including theirbelief that they
have a religious obligation to increase the number of businesses operating according to religious prin-
ciples.
181 See NeJaime & Siegel, supra note 22, at 2552 (quoting a Catholic Bishop who stated that
HobbyLobby is "a mandate for evangelization"). Althoughthere maybe arguments that investing for
the specific purpose of claiming exemptions in the greatest number of companies possible is not a
sincere exercise of religion, if the investortruly believes thatthey are commandedby theirfaithto use
their wealth to prevent sinful practices, it seems likely that such investments would qualify as reli-
gious exercise under the existing sincerity test. See supra notes 50 51 and accompanying text.
182 See Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 23, at 1430 (describing how corporate governance is
priced into transactions between corporate parties); id. at 1432 ("It turns out to be hard to find any
interesting item that does not have an influence on price.").
183 See, e.g., Sepper, supra note 22, at 941 (noting some evidence that healthcare nonprofits price
religious practices when selling religious hospitals).
1
14 RODDY BAILEY, SECURITIES LAWS IMPLICATIONS RELATED TO INVESTMENT WITH HIGH NET
WORTH INDIVIDUALS * 1 (2013), Westlaw 5290487 ("The term 'angel investor' has been applied to
high net worth individuals who were willing to invest in companies and 'save' the company from
business failure.").
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would continue to exercise control over the religion of the corporation, even as
his ownership interest shrinks. 185
This scenario may not be considered problematic because, as the Court
notes, state corporate law already allows for parties to contract regarding the
religious practices of the corporation, such as closing business operations on
the Sabbath. 186 Where a religious decision does not require an exemption to the
law, state law will allow the parties to bargain for whatever business practice
they prefer. 187 Each shareholder can place a value on their religious and secular
interests and negotiate for their most favored outcome.88 For example, a de-
vout investor may be willing to give up some share of corporate profits to the
agnostic shareholder to keep the corporation's stores closed on the Sabbath.
A crucial distinction must be drawn, however, between corporate deci-
sions in compliance with the law and decisions that require religious exemp-
tions to the law. Parties can monetize a religious practice, like closing the store
on the Sabbath, without monetizing religious sincerity because religious sin-
cerity is not required for religious acts in compliance with the law. 189 Applying
the same negotiation process to religious exemptions from neutrally applicable
laws is more problematic. Parties are not just making tradeoffs between them-
selves regarding profit and religion. They are asking the court to declare their
financial bargain an exercise of religious sincerity. In doing so, the court cre-
ates anew, and potentially valuable, "stick" in the corporate rights bundle-the
right to be judicially determined as the religious "soul" of the corporation. This
monetization of religious sincerity has the potential to increase the harm to
185 See Mocsary, supra note 4, at 1333 34 (describing how initial shareholders can "retain the
right to have the firm run in accord with their original contract, whether it calls for the pursuit of
wealth or another end"). To those unfamiliar with corporate practice, such contracting might seem
easy to regulate, but corporate lawyers make their living finding ways to contract around attempts to
regulate business relationships. They are largely successful because of the contractual freedom in
corporate law. See Christopher G. Bradley, Arworks as Business Entities: Sculpting Property Rights
by Private Agreement, 94 TUL. L. REv. 247, 247 48 (2020) (describing the use of business entities to
circumvent attempts to regulate contracts); Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 23, at 1433 (noting that
regulation of corporate relationships is difficult: jb]ecause so many terms are open to explicit con-
tracting, it is almost always possible to make an end run around any effort to defeat a particular [con-
tractual] tem").
186 HobbyLobby, 573 U.S. at718 19; see also Sepper, supra note 22, at 935 (describing contract-
ing for "Ethical and Religious Directives" that bind non-religious entities to the religious practices of
affiliated religious providers).
187 Such allowance is not always true if the decision will hurt corporate profits and the sharehold-
ers do not all agree. See infra Part III.B. 1.
188 See Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 23, at 1418 (highlighting how corporate law allows
participants to customize contractual terms to maximize value for shareholders).
189 For example, atheist shareholders could agree to close the corporation's stores onthe Sabbath
as a naked cash grab in an effort to appeal to a religious clientele, or a religious shareholder can "pur-
chase" the right to keep the store closed from a non-religious shareholder by agreeing to a smaller
percentage of corporate shares.
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protected groups who are not party to the bargain and diminishes the value of
religious liberty.
C. Monetizing Religious Sincerity Harms Third Parties
and Diminishes Religious Liberty
The potential dangers of monetizing religious sincerity are great-both
for third parties and for religious liberty itself Religious exemptions for corpo-
rations have been vigorously criticized as coming at the expense of third par-
ties. 190 The corporate exemption claims thus far have generally involved "reli-
gious objections to being made complicit in the assertedly sinful conduct of
others." 191 These "complicity-based conscience claims" focus on a third party's
conduct that is protected by the law and the claimant's belief that such conduct
is sinful. 192 Because they involve the choices of the people the law was intend-
ed to protect or benefit, complicity-based claims result in harm to identifiable
third parties. 193 The monetization of religious sincerity could lead to an in-
crease in religious exemption claims, especially by those who wish to parlay
their economic influence into cultural influence. The result would be to un-
dermine the gains made by historically disenfranchised groups through the
democratic process. 194
In addition to the potential harm to third parties, monetizing religious sin-
cerity is likely to diminish the value of religious liberty in the courts in several
ways. First, courts may consider the number of potential claims when deciding
190 See NeJaime & Siegel, supra note 22, at 2527 (discussing hanm to third parties); Douglas
NeJaime & Reva Siegel, Religious Exemptions andAntidiscrimination Law in Masterpiece Cakeshop,
128 YALE L.J. F. 201,216 18 (2018), https://www.yalelawjournal.org/pdf/NeJaimeSiegel t7ffwsct.
pdf [https://perma.cc/RH9A-3MSE] (describing harms caused by exemptions to public accommoda-
tion laws); Elizabeth Sepper, Contraception and the Birth of Corporate Conscience, 22 AM. U. J.
GENDER SOC. POL'Y & L. 303, 305 (2014) (noting that giving secular corporations the same exemp-
tions as religious organizations risks eroding "gender equality and religious freedom in all workplac-
es"). See generally Strine, supra note 7. These harms occur irrespective of the corporate form at issue.
191 NeJaime & Siegel, supra note 22, at 2519.
192 See id. at 2527 ("Complicity-based conscience claims are oriented toward third parties who do
not share the claimant's beliefs about the conduct in question. For this reason, their accommodation
has distinctive potential to impose material and dignitary harm on those the claimants condemn."); see
also Sepinwall, supra note 56, at 1905 (identifying that, underHobbyLobby, religious exemptions are
granted without consideration of the impact they have on those other than the sincerely religious).
193 See Hardee, supra note 77, at 229 30 (describing harm to reproductive rights and LGBT
community); Sepper, supra note 190, at 337 38 (noting complicity-based claims subrogate the em-
ployees' right to make their own decisions to the employer's morality).
194 See Sepper, supra note 7, at 1502 07 (arguing that court-imposed religious exemptions harm
third parties and the democratic process); Strine, supra note 155, at 458 59 (noting that exemptions or
workarounds make regulation to protect disenfranchised groups more expensive).
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to grant an exemption. 195 The government must show that the regulation burden-
ing the claimant's religion is "the least restrictive means of accomplishing a
compelling government interest," and the government may do so by "show[ing]
that there would be so many legitimate demands for a religious accommodation
that those accommodations would completely undermine the regulation." 1
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Second, judges' feelings that claimants have gamed the system by mone-
tizing religious sincerity may "creep" into their determinations on the other
elements of the claim. 197 Because they doubt the claimant's sincerity, judges
may be more likely to deny exemptions on other grounds, such as finding that
the claimant's religion is not substantially burdened. 198 Not only does this un-
dercut the rule of law, but also it "can have the unintended effect of perverting
a court's articulation of the requirements for a religious accommodation claim,
making it harder for sincere claimants in future cases to state a claim." 199
Third, and finally, monetized religious sincerity would likely diminish the
value of religious liberty among the public at large . 200 The availability of reli-
gious exemptions has led to a movement by academics who question whether
religion deserves special treatment under the law.20 1 The Court's pronounce-
ment that corporations can engage in protected religious exercise has already
tested America's faith in religious liberty.202 "Whether religion is 'a good
thing'-whether it ought to enjoy any kind of unique status, and whether that
status should find meaningful constitutional protection-has itself come up for
195 See Sepper, supra note 22, at 958 63 (describing how religious exemptions are designed to be
exceptions rather than the rule).
196 Chapman, supra note 8, at 1221.
197 Id. at 1215 16 (describing cases involving "suspicion creep" whenjudges believe claimants to
be insincere); see also Sepper, supra note 22, at 984 (noting that widespread contracting for religious
identity among healthcare providers may lead to courts scrutinizing religious claims and the definition
of a "religious entity" more closely).
198 Chapman, supra note 8, at 1216 (noting that this problematic practice appears to occur in other
cases involving unaddressed oubts regarding religious sincerity).
199 Id.
2
I Id. at 1222 ("When the government gives a pass to those who insincerely claim the benefits of
religious liberty, it erodes the value of that liberty in the eyes of the public.").
2o1 See generally, e.g., Kent Greenawalt, Fundamental Questions About the Religion Clauses:
Reflections on Some Critiques, 47 SANDIEGO L. REv. 1131, 1146-48 (2010) (clarifying the author's
position in the debate regarding whether religion is special); Lund, supra note 37, at 483 84 (describ-
ing the movement that sees religious exemptions "as undeservedly privileging religious commit-
ments-a kind of discrimination against those whose fundamental commitments are nonreligious in
nature"); Schwartzman supra note 37 (noting that the law treats religion as special but questioning
the justifications for such treatment).
22 See Paul Horwitz, The Hobby Lobby Moment, 128 HARV. L. REv. 154, 155 (2014) (noting
that Hobby Lobby marked a shift in public attitudes towards "the basic terms of the American church-
state settlement").
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grabs. 203 The awareness that religious sincerity is for sale is likely to damage
the reputation of religious liberty further.2 o4
Because such financial bargains often come at the expense of third par-
ties, condoning the sale of religious sincerity is even more likely to cause out-
rage-potentially undermining the legitimacy of the Court. Monetizing sinceri-
ty could be perceived as an expansion of religious accommodations driven by
wealthy individuals "buying back" the cultural control they have lost at the
ballot box. The Roberts Court has already been criticized for weaponizing the
First Amendment for the benefit of the wealthy.2 o5 A cynic might view the mone-
tization of religious sincerity as further evidence that the Roberts Court is not
motivated by a desire to protect religious liberty but, rather, is acting to give
those on the losing side of the culture wars the ability to circumvent the demo-
cratic process to reinstate cultural norms on the most vulnerable populations.
III. A FRAMEWORK FOR DETERNINING ATTRIBUTION
Mechanically applying state law regarding corporate control to the ques-
tion of attribution leads to results that conflict with the values underlying reli-
gious sincerity. A framework for determining attribution needs to consider the
unique nature of religious liberty as well as a nuanced understanding of state
corporate law. Corporations with dissenting shareholders raise different issues
than corporations with assenting agnostic shareholders, suggesting separate
considerations are necessary to determine attribution for each. Corporate law's
flexibility to customize corporate structure, resulting in a dizzying array of
business combinations, makes bright-line rules difficult to draw. Nevertheless,
there are factors that courts and policymakers should consider in trying to craft
rules for attribution. Ultimately, the most defensible result may be to require
unanimous, or near unanimous, religious incerity by corporate shareholders. It
is difficult to predict how the attribution question will ultimately be settled, as
whoever creates the test-federal or state, administrations or courts-is likely
to greatly impact the substance of the test itself.
A. Corporations with Dissenting Shareholders
The Court in Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc. recognized that minori-
ty shareholders may object to the corporation's exercise of religion. The major-
23 Id. at 159.
204 See Chapman, supra note 8, at 1222 (using a late-night comedian's parody of profit-seeking
churches to demonstrate how the public is affected by the perceptionthat religious exemptions shield
sham religions from the law).
25 See, e.g., Sepper, supra note 7, at 1453; Strine, supra note 155, at 423 24 (providing an over-
view of recent Supreme Court cases and noting the shift in influence towards the wealthy).
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ity noted that "[s]tate corporate law provides a ready means for resolving
[such] conflicts" and that the courts should turn to rules regarding corporate
structure "and the underlying state law in resolving disputes. 20 6 Existing state
law did not evolve with shareholder sincerity in mind, however, and is insuffi-
ciently protective of dissenting shareholders' religious convictions.
1. Applying Existing State Law
State corporate law generally provides little protection for minority share-
holders who disagree with the business decisions of controlling sharehold-
ers.207 The default rules give a shareholder, or a group of shareholders with a
bare majority of votes, the power to control the corporation.208 A majority
shareholder, or shareholders, can unilaterally elect every member of the
board,209 amend the charter and bylaws (including corporate purpose),210 de-
cide whether to issue dividends,211 and make the decision to sell the corpora-
tion.2 12 Minority shareholders' rights are generally limited to the fiduciary du-
ties owed to them by majority shareholders.2 13 Minority shareholders are ex-
206 573 U.S. 682, 718 19 (2014).
207 See Smith, supra note 19, at 310 ("Since the earliest reported cases, courts have consistently
held that the will of the majority of the shareholders governs business corporations in all actions with-
in the bounds of the corporate charter."). Because corporate law is a matter of state law both statuto-
ry and common law there is no monolithic "state corporate law." This Article does not provide a
fifty-state survey but, rather, necessarily speaks in generalities about common state practices and pro-
vides examples from specific states.
208Douglas K. Moll, Shareholder Oppression in Close Corporations: The Unanswered Question
ofPerspective, 53 VAND. L. REV. 749,757 (2000) (describing majority shareholder control over close
corporations).
209 See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 216(3) (2020) (electing directors via plurality of sharehold-
ervotes). Some states allow, or even mandate cumulative voting, which allows minority shareholders
to have some representation on the board. See, e.g., CAL. CORP. CODE § 708 (West 2019) (mandating
cumulative voting for nonpublic corporations). Cumulative voting still leaves the majority shareholder
with a majority of the seats on the board, which is sufficient for complete control over board action
under the default rules. See Moll, supra note 208, at 757.
210 See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 216(2) ("In all matters other than the election of directors,
the affirmative vote of the majority of shares ... shall be the act of the stockholders.").
211 The board of directors controls the decision to issue dividends. See, e.g., id. § 141 (a), (c)(2)
(giving the board power to run the corporation and to declare dividends).
212 The decision to merge the corporation at one time required unanimous shareholder consent but
no longer does. Pollman, supra note 7, at 649; see, e.g., DEL. CODE. ANN. tit. 8 § 141; MODEL BUS.
CORP. ACT § 11.04(e).
213 Mocsary, supra note 4, at 1332 33. Many states employ a "reasonable expectations test" that
will allow minority shareholders to challenge corporate decisions by the majority that encroach on the
minority's "reasonable expectations to be employed by the corporation, to be involved in managing it,
and to receive corporate distributions, either in salary or dividends." Manuel A. Utset, A Theory of
Self Control Problems andIncomplete Contracting: The Case ofShareholder Contracts, 2003 UTAH
L. REV. 1329, 1346. Although these minority oppression cases do not center on corporate profit, they
do involve the financial interests of minority shareholders, such ascontinued employment. See Moll,
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pected to contract ex ante for the power to protect themselves from the ultimate
control the law gives majority shareholders.214 If they fail to do so, the law locks
in their investment in the corporation.215 Once locked in, minority shareholders
have no control over how their investment is used and, in a corporation with no
market for its stock, very little practical ability to cash it out.
216
Corporate law recognizes the precarious position that minority sharehold-
ers are in vis-a-vis the majority with the doctrine of minority shareholder op-
pression. One of the most important tools for protecting minority-shareholder
interests is the profit maximization doctrine, which requires those controlling
the corporation to put shareholder profit above other interests.217 One of the
driving forces behind profit maximization is the ideathat all shareholders have
a right to earn the most profit possible from their investment. Thus, courts will
intervene, if the majority shareholders are frustrating the minority's ability to
accomplish that end.218
The Court, perhaps unwittingly, gave an example of such a claim when it
raised potential non-RFRA religious disputes among shareholders about clos-
ing the company's store on the Sabbath.219 The Court suggests that the rules
regarding the establishment of a corporation's governing structure would an-
swer this question, but the power to do so under the corporate structure is not
the end of the story. Even if a majority shareholder had the control right to de-
cide to close the store on the Sabbath, that decision would be subject to the
supra note 208, at 757 58 (describing ways a controlling shareholder can impact the financial inter-
ests of a minority shareholder).
214 Utset, supra note 213, at 1343. This can be done in a variety of ways, such as contracting for
employment security, veto power over corporate decisions, and dispute resolution mechanisms. Id.
215 Locking in the capital investment of shareholders is one of the key features of the corporation.
See Larry E. Ribstein, Should History Lock in Lock-in?, 41 TULSA L. REV. 523, 523 (2006) (describ-
ing the capital lock-in of corporate investments).
216 See Pollman, supra note 7, at 652 (noting that shareholders in a closely held corporation have
no market for their shares); Utset, supra note 213, at 1341 (describing the lack of meaningful exit
options for minority shareholders).
217 See, e.g., eBay Domestic Holdings, Inc. v. Newmark, 16 A.3d 1, 34 (Del. Ch. 2010) (holding
that majority shareholders cannotvalue social goals over shareholder profit at the expense of minority
shareholders); Dodge v. Ford Motor Co., 170 N.W. 668, 684 (Mich. 1919) (same); see also Smith,
supra note 19, at 318 21 (demonstrating the importance of the shareholder primacy norm in minority
oppression cases).
218 See, e.g., eBay Domestic Holdings, 16 A.3d at 34. Applying this rule to the question of a mi-
nority shareholder who disagrees with the majority's religious decisions for the corporation is compli-
cated by the Court's explicit rejection of shareholder profit maximization in Hobby Lobby. See 573
U.S. at 711 12 (stating that corporate law does not limit corporations to profit motives). The status of
the profit maximization doctrine is therefore in doubt. See Hardee, supra note 77, at 249 (noting the
conflict between the direction to use state corporate law to resolve intercorporate disputes and the
rejection of profit maximization).
219 See Hobby Lobby, 573 U.S. at 718 19.
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profit maximization, or minority oppression, rule.220 If the majority stated their
intent to put their religious beliefs ahead of the minority shareholder's reason-
able expectations of profit, at least some state courts would likely step in and
protect the minority shareholder's profit expectations.22'
Although shareholder-profit maximization provides some protection for
minority shareholders, it is greatly limited by the business judgment rule,
which protects the board from decisions made in good faith.222 In practice, as
long as the board claims the decision was made both to further their personal
religious beliefs and increase profits (or at least be profit neutral), the courts
will not second guess whether the decision will in fact be profitable.223 Even
an exemption that eventually hurts the company financially, such as taking a
potentially unpopular position that the company does not support equality
claims by the LGBTQ+ community, would be protected under the business
judgment rule, if the controlling shareholder claims a plausible marketing
strategy to gain sufficient religious customers to offset the customers lost by its
anti-LGBTQ+ stance.224
In addition, shareholder profit maximization provides no protection to
minority shareholders where the exercise of corporate religion does not impact
corporate profit. If a decision to claim an RFRA or free exercise exemption
does not impact the bottom line, or if it is financially beneficial to the corpora-
tion, the minority shareholder's financial interests are protected. Therefore,
minority shareholders likely have no claim under existing state law, even if
they object to the actions of the majority.
225
The ability of controlling shareholders to unilaterally implement a reli-
gious exemption is concerning because minority shareholders are locked into
220 Such a decision would be made by the board of directors, but the board in a closely held cor-
poration is generally responsive to the majority shareholders' demands. See Mocsary, supra note 4, at
1332 33. The board might have leeway to make such decisions, or be required to, if the corporate
charter provided otherwise.
221 See, e.g., eBay Domestic Holdings, 16 A.3d at 34. The majority shareholder could avoid this
claim by stating that the decision was made to increase profits-e.g. by tapping into a religious mar-
ket but that might impact the sincerity of their claim under RFRA.
222 See Mocsary, supra note 4, at 1333 (noting the "business judgment rule (BJR) makes it diffi-
cult for noncontrolling shareholders to vindicate their rights").
223 See, e.g., Gagliardi v. Trifoods Int'l, Inc., 683 A.2d 1049, 1049 (Del. Ch. 1996) (allowing
management leeway to determine what actions will be profitable). Although management is given
great leeway in determining what is in the best interests of the corporation, courts are more diligent in
policing fiduciary duties in closely held corporations. See Mocsary, supra note 4, at 1333.
224 Courts are reluctant to second-guess the business decisions of corporate managers, evenwhen
they end in financial disaster. See, e.g., In re Walt Disney Co. Derivative Litig., 906 A.2d 27,28 (Del.
2006) (finding no liability despite arguably ill-advised contract that cost company over $130 million).
225 Even in a state using the reasonable expectations test, the test would have to be modified to
include the expectation to determine the religious actions of the corporation. See Utset, supra note
213, at 1346 (describing reasonable expectations test).
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the corporation.226 Even if the dissenting shareholder walks away from any
management role, their investment is still funding the corporate religious ac-
tions with which they disagree.2 27 This problem is made obvious when consid-
ering a shareholder dissenting on religious grounds of their own. The majority
may wish to turn away LGBTQ+ customers on the ground that their religion
objects to gay marriage.228 But the minority shareholder may believe that dis-
criminating against LGBTQ+ individuals violates their religious beliefs in
equality and love for all.229 Being forced to fund a business that refuses service
for gay weddings may violate the minority's religious beliefs as strongly as
being forced to sell cakes for gay weddings violates the majority's beliefs.
230
States should, and are perhaps required to, take these claims seriously.231 If
they do not, a neutral state law-locking in the investment of shareholders-
will result in forcing a religious practice on an unwilling minority shareholder.
This is the same evil that justified the religious exemption in the first place.
The counterargument to this concern is that minority shareholders can al-
ready be forced to financially support religious practices that violate their be-
liefs so long as they do not affect corporate profits. The Court was correct that
corporations can make everyday business decisions that reflect the religious
beliefs of their shareholders.23 2 Corporate law gives minority shareholders lit-
tle say over those decisions, if they do not harm profits.233 If the board decides
the corporation should engage in a religious practice, either because of its own
religious convictions or at the behest of the majority shareholders who elect
them, minority shareholders currently have no recourse, even in public corpo-
rations, unless the religious practice can be shown to harm the bottom line.
234
226 See Ribstein, supra note 215, at 523.
227 Having their investment in the company used to fund practices the shareholder deemed sinful
was the crux of the petitioners' claims in Hobby Lobby. 573 U.S. at 700 03.
228 It is not clear whether a religious exemption to anti-discrimination laws will be permitted
under RFRA, but this hypothetical assumes it for the sake of the argument.
229 This religious dispute is currently making waves within the United Methodist Church. See Julie
Zauzmer & SarahPulliam Bailey, UnitedMethodist Church Votes to Maintain Its Opposition to Same-
Sex Marriage, Gay Clergy, WASH. POST (Feb. 26, 2019, 6:35 PM), https://www.washingtonpost.com/
religion/2019/02/26/united-methodist-church-vote s-maintain-its-oppo sition-same-sex-marriage - ay -
clergy/?utm tenn-.9255d26506d8 [https://perma.cc/D3C6-NRKD] (describing the rift among clergy
and theologians caused by the Church's vote to maintain its opposition to gay marriage).
230 If such complicity-based claims are treated as valid for a majority shareholder, they should be
uniformly treated when raised by minority shareholders.
231 AlthoughRFRA does not apply to the states, the minority shareholders may have a free exer-
cise claim similarto that raised by Masterpiece Cakeshop, Ltd. v. Colorado CivilRights Commission
or a claim under state religious freedom laws. See 138 S. Ct. 1719, 1720 (2018).
232 See Hobby Lobby, 573 U.S. at 710.
233 See supra Part I1.A. 1.
234 For example, the Marriott Corporation, a public company, puts copies of the Bible and The
Book of Mormon in almost all of its hotel rooms. The books are donated, and the company's position
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Religious exemptions to neutrally applicable laws are arguably distinct
from such everyday decisions. The most obvious distinction is that the latter
does not violate a neutrally applicable law and, thus, does not require a reli-
gious exemption. These decisions, therefore, do not require any showing of
religious sincerity by anyone in the corporation.23 5 As such, a corporation clos-
ing on the Sabbath does not necessarily attribute religious beliefs to the corpora-
tion's owners, whereas a religious exemption has the court's imprimatur that at
least some of the corporation's shareholders sincerely hold a particular belief.
In addition, the fact that a religious practice does not violate the law in-
forms the reasonable expectations of the parties. Minority shareholders under-
stand that they have little control over the decisions of the corporation-
economic, social, or religious-but they may have an expectation that the cor-
poration will be confined by the democratic process. Religious exemptions
provide an end run around the democratic process by constraining the law's
reach over certain practices. 236 Despite these distinctions, it is still ironic that a
dissenting minority shareholder has more ability to protect their financial in-
terests than their religious rights. If the law continues to expand the role of
corporations as religious actors, perhaps state law should adapt to further pro-
tect minority shareholders' religious interests, even when exemptions are not
necessary for the corporation's religious practice.
There is an additional complication caused by the fact that existing state
law only allows dissenting shareholders to block religious practices when they
can demonstrate that such practices hurt the corporation's bottom line. One
type of evidence the justices found compelling to demonstrate shareholders'
sincerity in both Hobby Lobby and Masterpiece Cakeshop, Ltd. v. Colorado
Civil Rights Commission was that the shareholders had previously sacrificed
profit to further their religious beliefs. 237 Although sacrificing profits does not
appear to be required to show religious sincerity, it is peculiar that controlling
shareholders would have a right to exercise their religion through the corpora-
tion only when they are equally pursuing profits as well as religious ends.238
is that some customers appreciate them, whereas the rest disregard them. Even though some share-
holders may disagree with the practice of supplying religious texts in the hotel rooms, there is no
recourse in corporate law to stop it. See Dee-Ann Durbin, Holy Nights: New Marriott Rooms to Get
Bible, Book ofMormon, U. S. NEWS & WORLD REP. (Aug. 25, 2018), https://www.usnews.com/news/
busine ss/article s/2018 -08 -2 5/a-room-with-a-pew -new -marriotts-get-bible -book-of-mormon [https://
perma.cc/HV3K-PZGE].
235 See supra notes 106 109 and accompanying text.
236 See Sepper, supra note 7, at 1453 (describing use of religious exemptions to circumvent dem-
ocratically enacted regulations). As a legislative enactment, RFRA could, at least theoretically, be
amended to limit corporate exemptions. If, however, the Supreme Court extends First Amendment
protection for corporate religious exemptions, a democratic response may be difficult.
237 See supra note 104 and accompanying text.
238 See supra note 106 and accompanying text.
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From the standpoint of corporate law, this outcome follows logically from the
primacy of corporate profit. From the standpoint of religious liberty, however,
it results in the law subjugating religious concerns to profit motives. It also
potentially raises questions about the sincerity of the controlling shareholders'
beliefs if they willingly entered into a corporation with a non-religious share-
holder knowing that the law would prevent them from exercising their religion
through the corporation if it impacted profits.239
2. Reconceiving Attribution with Dissenting Shareholders
A new framework is needed to consider attribution in corporations with dis-
senting shareholders that will adequately protect the minority's elevated interests
when determining religious sincerity. Protecting the religious rights of dissenting
shareholders as well as controlling shareholders is not an easy task. As a single
entity, it is difficult to divide the corporation in a way that accounts for the dif-
ferent desired ends of the various shareholders. This difficulty is one reason cor-
porate law largely concerns itself solely with shareholders' rights to profit from
the corporation.240 Money is easily apportioned outside the corporation and pro-
vides a universal metric by which to judge what each shareholder is owed,
thereby greatly simplifying the mediation of disagreements among shareholders.
Once the law recognizes the right to use the corporation for religious rea-
sons, however, this system is upended. Principles of religious freedom and
freedom from forced religious practice justify taking seriously dissenting
shareholders' concerns. One method courts could use to balance the religious
practices of majority and minority shareholders would be to provide ajudicial-
ly created exit option for minority shareholders.241 This solution would allow
the minority to exit the corporation on fair terms and the majority to use the
corporation to further their religious ends.
Another alternative would be to require that all shareholders agree to
adopting a corporate religion and to seeking a corporate religious exemption.
Although unanimous agreement is rarely required in corporate law, unanimity
239 This could be evidence that their actions do not "fit" with their professed belief that they must
run their corporation according to their religious beliefs even those that harm profits. See Chapman,
supra note 8, at 1234 35 (discussing narrative fit evidence). But, as Chapman notes, courts hould use
this evidence "thoughtfully," as inconsistent or imperfect religious practice is to be expected. Id. at
1234.
240 See, e.g., Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 23, at 1434 35 (justifying a lack of intervention
into contracting parties' agreements because "[i]nvestors and other participants agree on the stakes:
money").
241 Some courts already provide for judicial dissolution of the corporation or forced buyouts as
remedies for other forms of minority shareholder oppression. See Moll, supra note 208, at 759 60;
Robert A. Ragazzo, Toward a Delaware Common Law of Closely Held Corporations, 77 WASH. U.
L.Q. 1099, 1118 19 (1999).
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is necessary when fundamentally altering the corporate structure.242 The deci-
sion to turn the corporation into an entity that represents the shareholders' sin-
cere religious beliefs is arguably such a change.243 Corporations with a social
purpose as well as a profit motive, more commonly known as benefit corpora-
tions, are incorporated under an entirely different statutory scheme in the states
that allow them.244 Even if corporations are not required to reincorporate as ben-
efit corporations to request religious exemptions, a similarly fundamental change
to the corporate purpose suggests that unanimous shareholder approval is appro-
245priate. Requiring unanimous agreement addresses the problems raised by dis-
senting shareholder ights but leaves open the issue of determining sincerity
with assenting agnostic shareholders.
B. Corporations with Assenting Agnostic Shareholders
Corporations with assenting agnostic shareholders present a different set
of problems for religious sincerity. Unlike dissenting shareholders, assenting
agnostic shareholders are willing to allow the religious shareholder to claim
exemptions on behalf of the corporation in exchange for some secular benefit.
These corporations are made up of shareholders motivated by sincere religious
beliefs and shareholders with an insincere motivation-either profiting from
the exemption itself or the benefit they received from the religious shareholder
for their agreement. A framework is needed to determine which shareholders'
beliefs are attributed to the corporation for evaluating the corporation's request
for accommodation.
In creating such a framework, it is important to remember that corporate
law's preference for permissive private ordering combined with the value that
religious shareholders may place on the right to control the religious actions of
a corporation makes it likely that parties will be incentivized to innovate ways
to monetize religious sincerity through contracting.246 Given this, the test for
attribution must appropriately value religious sincerity and build on a realistic
and nuanced understanding of state corporate law. The first step is identifying
factors that courts should consider relevant in the attribution inquiry. These
242 See, e.g., MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT § 7.32(b) (requiring unanimous shareholder approval to
enter into shareholder agreement o alter corporate structure).
243 See Mocsary, supra note 4, at 1392 (suggesting "a near-unanimity" requirement to adopt a
corporate purpose other than profit).
244 See Hardee, supra note 77, at 247 (describing benefit corporations).
245 States could potentially create a religious benefit corporation code and require any corporation
seeking to claim an exemption to incorporate under that code. It is unclear whether the Supreme Court
would allow such a requirement. See Hobby Lobby, 573 U.S. at 709 (suggesting that the expression of
religion is not tied to the corporate form).
246 See supra Part II.B.2.
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factors can then be used to compare the benefits of a balancing test versus
bright-line rules for attribution. Ultimately, without greatly restricting the free-
dom to contract for religious sincerity, it is difficult to create a workable test.
1. Potential Factors Relating to Attribution
There are a number of factors that courts should consider in determining
whose religious beliefs to attribute to the corporation. None of them is suffi-
cient on its own to determine corporate sincerity, and each is malleable by con-
tract in ways that raise questions about the corporation's qualifications for an
exemption. But each of them provides some insight into the balance between
the religiously sincere and the assenting agnostic shareholders within the cor-
poration.
a. Control Held by Sincerely Religious Shareholders
Control cannot be the only metric used to determine attribution because
its malleability by contract could lead to corporations claiming exceptions with
little, or even no, human sincerity within the corporation.247 In addition, con-
trol is easily monetized within the corporation, leading to the inevitable mone-
tization of corporate sincerity.248 Whereas control should not be sufficient to
find attribution, significant control by the religious shareholder is necessary.
The Court in Hobby Lobby focused on the control the Hahn and Green families
exercised over their corporations as a key factor in holding that they had suffi-
cient overlap of identity with the corporations to justify an exemption.249 A
religious shareholder who is merely a passive investor has a weaker argument
that the corporation's actions are attributable to them.25o
Control is necessary, but what type of control must be demonstrated by
religious shareholders is a complicated question. "Control" in a corporation is
not a monolithic concept. 251 Control does not necessarily coincide with share
ownership interests in the corporation-an individual can be a minority share-
247 See supra Part I1B.. 1.
248 See supra Part II.B.2.
249 See 573 U.S. at 700 03.
250 A passive investor could also run into trouble withthe veracity inquiry. If a shareholder claims
that a passive ownership interest in a corporation that engages in a "sinful" practice burdens their
religious practice, the court could inquire whether they have passive ownership interests in other cor-
porations that engage in the same "sinful" practice such as stock ownership in public markets. See
Chapman, supra note 8, at 1234 35 (discussing narrative fit evidence).
251 See Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 23, at 1417 (describing the various ways corporate
control can be divided).
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holder but still wield control over the entire corporation.252 In addition, control
in a corporation can be divided up for specific purposes.253 For example, differ-
ent classes of shares may have special voting power on specific issues or for des-
ignated board positions. In nonpublic corporations, shareholders can enter into
shareholder agreements that allow them to divvy up control among themselves
or even designate third parties to exert control over corporate decisions.254
This flexibility to parse out corporate control is a key feature of corporate
law, but it makes it difficult to value the control exercised by the religious share-
holders in relation to the agnostic shareholders for purposes of attribution of re-
ligious sincerity. If courts wish to prevent he monetization of religious sincerity
by ferreting out business arrangements that are motivated by a desire to buy or
sell the corporations' religious practices, they should focus on the nature of the
control held by religious shareholders. Control that relates only to the corporate
practices underlying the exemption in question should be suspect, as they are
most likely to be motivated by strategic contracting to gain an exemption. Gen-
eral control over the business practices of the corporation provides better evi-
dence of the religious shareholders' involvement in the company. Even complete
control over the corporation, however, should not be sufficient to demonstrate
sincerity for the corporation, as that would include a sizeable number of public
corporations whose sincerity would almost certainly be rejected.255
b. "Ownership Interest" Held by Sincerely Religious Shareholders
Another factor that courts should consider in determining attribution is
the "ownership" or "equity" interest held by sincerely religious shareholders.
The Court in Hobby Lobby placed great emphasis on the families' ownership
of the corporations involved, suggesting ownership is relevant to the attribu-
tion inquiry. 256 Equity interest can be conceived of as roughly the shareholder's
percentage of financial interest in the company. In a corporation with a simple,
single class structure, a shareholder who owns 5 1% of the common stock could
252 One example of this type of control is dual class structures, where some shareholders have
control rights and others do not, which leads to great disparities between ownership and control. See
Sharfman, supra note 129, at 7 (describing dual class structures).
253 See Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 23, at 1417 18 (providing descriptions of different
structural changes).
254 See MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT § 7.32(a)(8) (permitting agreements that divide up corporate
control in any way that does not violate public policy).
255 See Bebchuk & Hamdani, supra note 126, at 1279 (noting that "a sizeable minority of large,
publicly traded firms" have controlling shareholders).
256 573 U.S. at 700 02; see also Hardee, supra note 75, at 771 72 (describing the Court's focus
on ownership). Likewise, the fact that the Court suggested that the relevant group to consider in public
companies is the shareholder class, rather than the board of directors, suggests that share ownership is
more important than control over the corporation. See id. at 717.
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be considered a 5 1% "owner" of the corporation.257 Financial interest is less
susceptible to gamesmanship because agnostic owners would be less likely to
give up a significant portion of the raison d'Otre for corporate ownership-
profit. Like with every aspect of corporate practice, however, the ability to
contract complicates the "ownership" question. There are myriad ways to cal-
culate the "ownership" of a corporation based on contracts relating to share
ownership, and determined parties can provide financial benefits, such as divi-
dends, to shareholders without correlating such benefits to equity ownership. 
258
Despite this malleability, the concept of equity or ownership stake in the
company is likely still the metric that most reliably tracks the religious share-
holders' financial investment in the corporation. As such, it provides a helpful
way to think about what is meant by "sincerity" in the context of religiously
heterogeneous hareholders. Is an individual's financial interest in the corpora-
tion the right metric to determine how much weight to place on their religious
sincerity? If so, how much investment is enough? Corporate law would likely
answer the first question in the affirmative.
Whether financial interest is the correct metric when thinking about reli-
gious sincerity is a different question. Valuing the religious beliefs of the ma-
jority shareholder at the expense of minority shareholders' religious beliefs i
problematic.259 Setting aside dissenting shareholders, using financial interest as
the determining factor for attributing religious sincerity to a corporation with
assenting agnostic shareholders raises questions about the nature of corporate
religious sincerity that require answers the Court has thus far obfuscated. To
determine what percentage of religious ownership is sufficient, it becomes im-
portant to more clearly delineate the rationales for granting corporations reli-
gious exemptions: Is it because religious shareholders somehow change the
nature of the corporation itself? Or is it because the religious shareholders have
a personal right o act through the corporation?
If the exemption is considered from the perspective of the corporation, the
percentage of ownership should be judged by the total impact that the religious
shareholders have on the corporation. In other words, are they sufficiently in-
fluential to transform the corporate entity into a religiously sincere body?260
257 The idea that shareholders "own" the corporation is controversial in corporate law, but this
sense of financial interest is the rough equivalent of the colloquial idea of ownership. In closely held
corporations, shareholders are more accurately conceived of as "owners." See Mocsary, supra note 4,
at 1330 (noting that with simply structured corporations "shareholders behave as owners in all rele-
vant ways").
258 Forexample, preferred shares that provide profit distributions but not a residual interest inthe
company arguably should not be considered equity ownership.
259 See supra Part I1.A. 1.
260 This question begins to resemble the legitimacy test for religious organizations under Title
VII. See Carlson, supra note 8, at 185 86.
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This might suggest hat attribution is appropriate when religious hareholders
hold more than fifty percent equity interest in the corporation because the cor-
poration itself is more sincere than not.261 A majority rule still leaves the poten-
tial for almost half the holders of the corporation's equity to be motivated by
profit. If a corporation with forty-nine percent of its equity held by religious
shareholders is not a religious corporation, a slight shift in its equity ownership
arguably does not fundamentally alter the nature of the corporation such that
the corporation itself is now a religious entity. 
262
If the rationale for granting corporations religious exemptions is based on
the individual shareholder's right to act through the corporation, the percentage
of ownership may be more appropriatelyjudged by the importance of the own-
ership share to the religious shareholder-not in relation to the corporation as a
whole.263 In that case, even a small equity interest in a corporation may take on
religious significance to a religious investor.264 The percentage of ownership,
therefore, may relate more to veracity than attribution: does the shareholder's
claim that his religion requires accommodation even in companies where he is
a minority shareholder "fit" with his other investments?265 Although this met-
ric takes seriously the religious shareholder's interest in the corporation, such a
rule would facilitate the monetization of corporate sincerity, much like the con-
trol rule.266 This monetization of sincerity would likely have negative side ef-
fects both to third parties and to the concept of religious liberty.267
c. Number of Sincerely Religious Shareholders
It is unlikely that even a combination ofmajority ownership and control is
sufficient to claim an exemption, otherwise numerous public companies would
qualify. 268 Although the idea of a religiously sincere public corporation may
sound absurd, considering ownership and control alone does not rule them out.
The relevant difference between public and privately held corporations appears
261 Under the Obama Administration, HHS took this approach to its regulations. See supra note
123 and accompanying text.
262 Such a corporation would certainly fail the legitimacy test for religious entities under Title
VII. See Carlson, supra note 8, at 185 86 (noting that for-profit corporations do not pass the primarily
religious test).
263 The Hobby Lobby opinion more clearly takes this approach. See supra Part I.B. 1.
264 For example, to an evangelical investor who invests to increase the number of corporations
acting in accordance with his religious beliefs, even a small ownership share in the corporation may
be fundamental to his religious exercise. See supra notes 175 181 and accompanying text.
265 See Chapman supra note 8, at 1234 35 (describing narrative fit evidence).
266 See supra Part II.B.2.
267 See supra Part II.C.
268 See Bebchuk & Hamdani, supra note 126, at 1279 (noting that 220 public companies have one
shareholder with more than fifty percent ownership and control).
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to be the number of people involved. Even with a small number of religious
shareholders controlling the majority of the corporation's equity, the thousands,
or even hundreds of thousands, of agnostic or dissenting public shareholders are
difficult to ignore .269 This suggests that courts should consider the total number
of shareholders involved in the corporation-both sincere and agnostic-in
determining attribution.
This is a somewhat unusual axis on which to consider sincerity from a
corporate law standpoint, as the number of people behind a corporate action is
rarely relevant-it is ownership or control rights that matter. The number of
shareholders is sometimes relevant, however, when the law makes distinctions
between corporations for certain privileges. For example, some states define
"closely held" corporations in part by their number of shareholders.270 The
ability to claim pass-through taxation as an "S Corp" under the federal tax laws
is dependent on having one hundred or fewer shareholders.27' In considering
religious sincerity, placing a value on each individual's religious beliefs rather
than focusing solely on their financial investment in the corporation tracks well
with the personal nature of religion and gives equal weight to each individual's
religious interests.
d. Corporate Religious Action
Despite the focus on the shareholders' religious sincerity, the Court has
also placed some emphasis on the way that shareholders express their sincerity
through the corporation.272 Part of the veracity inquiry requires religious
shareholders to demonstrate that their religious beliefs include a requirement
that they run the corporation in accordance with their faith.
273
Whether the religious practices of the corporation should be relevant to
the attribution inquiry again depends on whether attribution is based on the
corporation itself being transformed into a religious entity or whether sincerity
269 This is especially true because many of these shareholders are institutional investors who
represent an even larger number of Americans who invest in corporations through mutual funds and
pensions. See Strine, supra note 155, at 443-44 (describing the prevalence of modem stock ownership
and ownership through intermediaries).
271 See, e.g., CAL. CORP. CODE § 158(a) (defining closely held corporations as those withfewerthan
thirty-five shareholders). Other states allow certain contracting options only to nonpublic companies,
regardless of the number of shareholders. See, e.g., MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT § 7.32 cmt. 4 (explaining
that section 7.32(d) requires that shareholder agreements are void after a company goes public).
27 126 U.S.C. § 1361 (b)(a) (2018). S Corps provide a good analogy to religious corporations be-
cause the U.S. Internal Revenue Service allows them to be taxed as if the corporate form did not exist.
See Mocsary, supra note 4, at 1329. This is much like the way the Court treats religious exemptions
for corporations. See supra notes 159 171 and accompanying text (discussing courts disregarding the
corporate form to grant religious exemptions).
272 See supra notes 104 105 and accompanying text.
273 See supra notes 106 107 and accompanying text.
1812 [Vol. 61:1763
The Paradox ofReligious Sincerity
continues to be determined by examining the shareholders' individual rights.
For the former, religious practices by the corporation are certainly relevant.
27 4
For the latter, causing the corporation to take religious actions-even profit-
reducing actions-provides mixed feedback. Because minority shareholders
likely have the ability to prevent corporate religious practices that harm the
bottom line, evidence that the corporation engaged in such behavior is really
evidence that the religious shareholder is willing to "buy" consent to those
practices from the agnostic shareholder. 275 That evidence may point to attribu-
tion, if the monetization of religious practices is considered in weighing the
relative strength of the religious shareholder's commitment to their beliefs. On
the other hand, the ability and desire to commit the corporation to religious
practices may be probative of the relative influence of the religious shareholder
over the corporation.
2. Balancing Test Versus Bright-Lines
The question of attribution should factor in the relative control, equity
ownership, and number of the religious versus agnostic shareholders, as well
as corporate religious action. Although the relevant factors can be identified,
the question of how to use them to determine attribution is far more difficult.
Corporate law's strong commitment to the freedom to contract means that eve-
ry corporation presents a unique combination of control, ownership, number of
shareholders, and corporate action. This makes bright-line rules regarding at-
tribution difficult, as they are likely to be both under- and over-inclusive.
276
Bright-line rules also have the disadvantage of providing a roadmap for mone-
tizing sincerity by giving corporate participants clear guidelines as to what
contracting is necessary for a finding of religious sincerity.
277
A balancing test that weighs the factors might be preferable, as it allows
the courts to make fine-tuned determinations regarding sincerity given each
corporation's unique structure. To be effective, however, any balancing test
requires a better definition of what is meant by sincerity in the corporate con-
text. The Supreme Court has largely sidestepped the question because homog-
274 This test finds a corollary in the legitimacy test for religious organizations, which focuses on
"the organization's creation, purpose, function, activity and self-expression to the community." Carl-
son, supra note 8, at 185.
275 See supra Part III.A. 1.
26 See Lesinski, supra note 120, at 507 09 (critiquing the Obama-era regulations that draw
bright-line rules for eligibility for exemptions as both under- and over-inclusive).
277 Corporate lawyers excel at this practice, which is generally not considered problematic n most
instances because corporate law is designed to monetize corporate power. See Bradley, supra note
185, at 25 (describing broad latitude given to the creation of business entities to circumvent regula-
tions). This monetization is problematic, however, in the religious liberty context. See supra Part II.C.
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enous religious sincerity among shareholders makes it easy to ignore the cor-
poration and, with it, the way corporate law and practice complicates the ques-
tion of religious sincerity with religiously heterogeneous hareholders. The
ultimate question for corporate exemptions that the Court appears to have em-
braced thus far is whether the corporation is owned and operated in such a way
that it justifies disregarding the entity and looking through to the sharehold-
ers. 278 If the ultimate question is whether the corporate entity can be disregard-
ed, a balancing test that tries to determine the weight or impact of the religious
shareholders versus agnostic shareholders on the corporation misses the mark.
So too would a test that seeks to determine whether any of the parties were
motivated to contract solely to claim a religious exemption.
A test for attribution that resolves the question of whether the corporate
entity can be disregarded would be better conceptualized as determining
whether the corporate structure involves relationships among religious and
nonreligious shareholders with sufficient complexity to make ignoring the cor-
porate entity difficult. Although it is relatively easy to ignore the corporation
with homogenous hareholders, the ntity is harder to disregard when a web of
contractual arrangements and corporate law rules define the relationship be-
tween parties with divergent values. The mere existence of contracting among
the shareholders relating to, or effecting, the corporate religious practice under-
lying the exemption could serve to solidify the separate corporate entity and
counsel against finding attribution. Because corporate law includes default
rules that create contracts between shareholders regarding control and owner-
ship interest, such a test would likely find that more than de minimis involve-
ment by nonreligious shareholders in the corporation makes the separate cor-
porate entity difficult to ignore.
C. Who Will Define the Attribution Inquiry?
Although the Court has detailed the veracity inquiry for corporate reli-
gious sincerity, the need for the attribution inquiry has thus far gone unnoticed.
Other than suggesting that corporations with religiously heterogeneous hare-
holders may still claim exemptions, how to determine whose sincerity should
be attributed to the corporation is uncharted territory. This Article has provided
a framework for attempting to untangle the many issues raised by attribution,
but the factor that will likely be the most influential in determining how sincer-
271 See supra Part I.B. 1.
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ity is ultimately attributed to the corporation is whether the states orthe federal
courts will make the decision.279
The question of religious sincerity under RFRA and the Free Exercise
Clause has traditionally been a question for the federal courts. As demonstrated
by the decisions in Hobby Lobby and Masterpiece Cakeshop, the Court ap-
pears unwilling to leave this decision with respect to corporations entirely in
the states' hands.280 States are unlikely to have the authority to define corpora-
tions as unable to exercise religion in any circumstances.281 The Court has now
spoken to what religious sincerity looks like in corporate form, likely estab-
lishing the ability to exercise religion through a closely held corporation with
homogeneous religious sincerity, regardless of state law to the contrary.282 In
addition, questions relating to the veracity of shareholders' beliefs will likely
remain in the purview of the federal courts, as they closely mirror the ques-
tions of sincerity relating to individual claimants.283
Although some measure of corporate religion appears fixed by the federal
courts, the open questions regarding attribution in heterogeneous corporations
involve mixed questions of religious sincerity and corporate structure that do
not fit squarely under either religious exemption or state corporate law. Despite
the federal courts' experience in determining individual sincerity, attribution
involves questions of corporate governance that are outside the federal courts'
wheelhouse. State corporate law, on the other hand, is largely unconcerned
with the sincerity of beliefs but is expert at the distribution of power within the
corporate structure, the validity of private agreements between the parties, and,
to a lesser extent, harm to the public from the corporate form.284 Determining
religious sincerity for a religiously heterogeneous corporation necessarily con-
cerns proper corporate purpose, the internal control structures of corporations,
279 It is also possible that Congress could step in and lay out a test for attribution in RFRA itself.
See Adams & Barmore, supra note 8, at 66 (suggesting that Congress amend RFRA to address this
issue). This solution would not affect free exercise claims.
280 See Buccola, supra note 7, at 599 (noting that state power cannot override the Court's inter-
pretation of corporate rights).
281 Although, this is not entirely foreclosed. The Court's holding in Hobby Lobby rested on the
statement that states do not require corporations to exist solely for profit. See 573 U.S. at 713. The
question of corporate purpose is one traditionally left to the states, so it is an open question whether a
state could clearly declare that the Court was incorrect in allowing a non-profit motive for a corpora-
tion chartered in the state. See Buccola, supra note 7, at 599 (proposing that state may have the au-
thority to "effectively cabin the consequences of federal rights" by "disempower[ing] the corporations
they create from doing the kinds of things that implicate disfavored federal rights").
282 Although Hobby Lobby decided this issue under RFRA, it is still an open question under the
Free Exercise Clause, although the complete lack of attention paid to the corporation inMasterpiece
Cakeshop suggests that the same treatment will likely apply under the First Amendment. See supra
note 69 and accompanying text.
283 See supra Part I.B.2.
284 See supra Part II.B. 1.
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and issues relating to the appropriate use of contracts, which suggests states
should play a strong role in determining the applicability of religious exemp-
tions for religiously heterogeneous corporations.
Despite their lack of expertise in state corporate law, the federal courts
may be unwilling to cede control to the states on matters of federal statutory
and constitutional interpretation, especially if the Court perceives that some
states are likely to curb the availability of religious rights to corporations. The
Supreme Court may federalize the attribution inquiry by determining whether
and how heterogeneous shareholders can contract for corporate religion.
285
They could conceivably draw the line anywhere between requiring unanimous
shareholder eligious sincerity and allowing any contracting so long as at least
one shareholder is sincerely religious. Regardless of what they decide, short of
unanimous approval, locking every state into a single set of rules regarding
corporate contracting would be an unprecedented federalization of state corpo-
rate law.286 Even a rule that requires states to treat contracts relating to reli-
gious exemptions the same as any other corporate contracts does not provide
an easy solution, as every state has exceptions to the freedom to contract.287 In
addition, corporate religion for heterogeneous hareholders is a sui generis
question. There are no other corporate questions that combine the personal na-
ture of religion, the potential for harm to others, and the possibility of monetiz-
ing religious sincerity-making determination of the appropriate corporate law
analog a fraught proposition.
Alternatively, the federal courts could allow states to play their traditional
role in determining proper corporate purposes and governance structures.
Scholars have noted that the Court's recent decisions regarding corporate
rights put pressure on state corporate law to determine how such rights can be
exercised.288 The Court in Hobby Lobby explicitly tasked state law to deter-
mine the rights of dissenting shareholders.28 9 It is unclear whether this delega-
tion requires states to simply apply existing state law to these new corporate
rights or if states retain the power to adapt their corporate law to changing cir-
285 In defining corporate purpose, the Court has already indicated a willingness to federalize cor-
porate law to an unprecedented extent. See Hardee, supra note 77, at 22 23 (describing the creeping
federalization of state corporate law).
286 States have traditionally had the power to define their corporate creations and what powers
may be wielded through the corporate form. See Buccola, supra note 7, at 609 10 (describing the
history of state control over the corporations they charter).
287 See Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 23, at 1417 18 (noting that "[s]ome things are off-
limits" for corporate contracting, such as many rules relating to fiduciary duties and fraud).
288 See, e.g., Pollman, supra note 7, at 665; Strine, supra note 155, at 497.
289 573 U.S. at 717 18. Likewise, the Court in Citizens United tasked "the procedures of corporate
democracy" to determine who speaks forthe corporation. Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm'n, 558
U.S. 310, 361 62 (2010) (quoting First Nat'l Bank of Bos. v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 794 (1978)).
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cumstances.290 Until the Court holds otherwise, states may decide to push back
on federalization by determining the attribution of religious sincerity in reli-
giously heterogeneous corporations.29'
Although there are many advantages to states defining the attribution
question, one major drawback is that such an approach would likely lead to
inconsistency among the states. Because the state of incorporation generally
determines the state corporate law that governs, the application of RFRA-a
federal statute-would vary depending on the state of incorporation.292 Per-
haps even more troubling, if the Court adopts a similar model for First
Amendment claims, the constitutional rights of individuals acting through their
corporations would likewise vary state by state. This inconsistency may be
tolerable because shareholders may choose their state of incorporation, but
there are still potential issues. First, state corporate law allows a controlling
shareholder to reincorporate in a different state without the permission of a
minority shareholder.29 3 Thus, concerns about protecting dissenting sharehold-
ers are amplified because the majority shareholder can move the corporation to
a state with fewer protections after the minority's investment is locked in.294
Second, such a system could put pressure on the choice-of-law rule that
the state of incorporation provides the law governing the internal workings of
the corporation, otherwise known as the internal affairs doctrine.295 Because
religious exemptions have the potential to harm third parties in the state where
the corporation does business, states may choose not to apply the internal af-
290 See Buccola, supra note 7, at 616 17; Hardee, supra note 77, at 246 47.
291 Several commentators have argued in favor of a more robust use of state power in response to
federal corporate rights. See generally Lucian A. Bebchuk & Robert J. Jackson, Jr., Corporate Politi-
cal Speech: Who Decides?, 124 HARV. L. REv. 83 (2010) (arguing states should adapt special deci-
sion-making rules for corporate political speech); Buccola, supra note 7 (providing justification for
state power in this area); Hardee, supra note 77 (arguing states should adapt veil piercing test to take
into account claims for religious exemptions); Joseph K. Leahy, Corporate Political Contributions as
BadFaith, 86 U. COLO. L. REv. 477 (2015) (arguing political expenditures may constitute bad faith
under state law).
292 See Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 23, at 1420 (describing competitionbetween states and
noting that the "fifty states offer different menus of devices (fromvotingby shareholders to fiduciary
rules to derivative litigation) for the protection of investors"). The Court may not be troubled by this
fact, as they suggested such an outcome inHobby Lobby with respect to corporations with dissenting
shareholders.
293 This is usually accomplished by causing the corporation to merge with a newly created corpo-
ration in another state. See Federico M. Mucciarelli, The Function of Corporate Law and the Effects of
Reincorporations in the U.S. and the EU, 20 TUL. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 421, 427 (2012) (describing
the process of reincorporationthrough merger). The default rule is that mergers require only majority
shareholder approval. See supra note 212.
294 See supra Part I1.A. 1.
295 See Buccola, supra note 7, at 635 36 (defining the internal affairs doctrine).
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fairs doctrine to questions about the ability to contract for exemptions. 29 6 If so,
the availability of an exemption would rely on where the conduct takes place
rather than the state of incorporation. This furthers the state's interest in pro-
tecting its citizens while still preserving some measure of choice for corporate
shareholders, as they can choose whether to do business in the state. It does
not, however, provide the much more painless choice of simply incorporating
in a different state than where the shareholder lives and works.297
The Supreme Court will almost certainly speak on corporate religious ex-
emptions again. In the meantime, states may decide to begin filling in the gaps
regarding attribution of corporate sincerity-either as legislative changes to cor-
porate codes or through the development of common law doctrine. Ultimately,
the doctrine of attribution is likely to be created through conversations between
states and the federal courts, with uncertainty lying in how much leeway the fed-
eral courts are willing to give states in determining their own state corporate law.
CONCLUSION
The Roberts Court's commitment to religious liberty suggests it is likely
to continue pushing the evolution of religious accommodation doctrine by in-
creasing the ability of individuals to claim exemptions on behalf of the corpo-
rations they own and operate. It is inevitable that courts will eventually be
faced with claims for religious accommodation by religiously heterogeneous
corporations. The traditional method of determining religious sincerity for in-
dividuals is incomplete when adjudicating an exemption claim by a corpora-
tion with both religiously sincere shareholders and shareholders who disavow
any religious motivations. An attribution inquiry is necessary to fully consider
the corporation's right to an exemption. This question of attribution places cor-
porate law's freedom to contract squarely at odds with the idea that religious
liberty is different in kind from more mundane market commodities. Courts
faced with determining attribution should be careful not to diminish the value
of religious liberty by allowing parties to monetize religious sincerity in the
name of religious freedom.
296 See Gregory Scott Crespi, Choice of Law in Veil-Piercing Litigation: Why Courts Should
Discard the InternalAffairs Rule and Embrace General Choice-of-Law Principles, 64 N.Y.U. ANN.
SURV. AM. L. 85, 98 (2008) (arguing that the internal affairs doctrine should not apply when third
parties are harmed by corporate actions). It is debatable whether the internal affairs doctrine is consti-
tutionally required or merely a policy of comity between the states, but states have carved out excep-
tions to the internal affairs doctrine without incident, especially when it relates to a strong public in-
terest in the state. See Buccola, supra note 7, at 636 37.
297 The law does not require the corporation to do any business within its state of incorporation
so the choice to incorporate may be made entirely on the desire for the incorporating state's corporate
law. See Hardee, supra note 77, at 240 41.
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